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BEYOND ALGORITHMS: TOWARD A
NORMATIVE THEORY OF AUTOMATED
REGULATION
FELIX MORMANN*

Abstract: The proliferation of artificial intelligence in our daily lives has spawned a
burgeoning literature on the dawn of dehumanized, algorithmic governance. Remarkably, the scholarly discourse overwhelmingly fails to acknowledge that automated,
non-human governance has long been a reality. For more than a century, policymakers have relied on regulations that automatically adjust to changing circumstances, without the need for human intervention. This Article surveys the track record of
self-adjusting governance mechanisms to propose a normative theory of automated
regulation. Effective policy-making frequently requires anticipation of future developments, from technology innovation to geopolitical change. Self-adjusting regulation offers an insurance policy against the well-documented inaccuracies of even the
most expert forecasts, reducing the need for costly and time-consuming administrative proceedings. Careful analysis of empirical evidence, existing literature, and precedent reveals that the benefits of regulatory automation extend well beyond mitigating regulatory inertia. From a political economy perspective, automated regulation
can accommodate a wide range of competing beliefs and assumptions about the future to serve as a catalyst for more consensual policy-making. Public choice theory
suggests that the same innate diversity of potential outcomes makes regulatory automation a natural antidote to the domination of special interests in the policy-making
process. Today's automated regulations rely on relatively simplistic algebra, a far cry
from the multivariate calculus behind smart algorithms. Harnessing the advanced
mathematics and greater predictive powers of artificial intelligence could provide a
significant upgrade for the next generation of automated regulation. Any gains in
mathematical sophistication, however, will likely come at a cost if the widespread
scholarly skepticism toward algorithmic governance is any indication of future backlash and litigation. Policy-makers should consider carefully whether their objectives
may be served as well, if not better, through more simplistic, but well-established
methods of regulatory automation.
© 2021, Felix Mormann. All rights reserved.
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INTRODUCTION

Artificial intelligence is all the rage these days, dominating the public discourse from investor earnings calls to legal scholarship.' Between 2017 and
2019, twenty-two of the top twenty-five law reviews in the United States published one or more pieces on smart algorithms, machine learning, and other
forms of artificial intelligence.2 Remarkably, the burgeoning literature on artificial intelligence and the future of algorithmic governance almost universally
fails to acknowledge that non-human, automated governance has long been a
reality. For more than a century, policy-makers have relied on regulations that
automatically adjust to changing circumstances in order to mitigate the negative consequences flowing from flawed forecasts and regulatory inertia.
Policy-makers have no crystal ball. Yet, they are frequently required to
anticipate the future as they adopt new, or amend existing, laws and regulations. 3 The stakes are high. Laws and regulations crafted on the basis of false
assumptions about the future have, at best, no real-life impact and, at worst, a
negative impact on public health, economic development, and other important
goods. Few areas are more prone to these pitfalls than energy law and policy,
the case study serving as the empirical backdrop for this Article's normative
inquiry into the merits of regulatory automation.4
Power plants, transmission lines, and other energy assets take years, if not
decades, to build and require vast amounts of capital investment. Once deployed, many of these assets have a useful life of forty years or more.5 Add to
1See, e.g., Andrew Barnes, 2018 Trends That Will Remain All the Rage in 2019, ENTREPRENEUR: ASIA PACIFIC (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/327479 [https://penna.cc/
NH8A-HYS4] (listing artificial intelligence as a top trend for entrepreneurs across the globe); Kim
Hart, WhyAIIsAll the Rage RightNow, AXIOS (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.axios.com/why-ai-is-allthe-rage-right-now-1513300691-b75d9693-cb04-466b-89e l-5976707d124a.html [https://perma.cc/
CKT6-PJJC] (noting the dramatic increase in companies discussing artificial intelligence during earnings calls).
2 This data is based on search of title and abstract across the 2017-2019 volumes of the flagship
law reviews of the top twenty-five law schools per US. News and WorldReport. See 2021 Best Law
Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (2020), https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-lawschools/law-rankings [https://web.archive.org/web/20201128215119/https://www.usnews.com/bestgraduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings] (search log on file with author).
'See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEo. L.J. 901, 901 (2011) ("Many of the pressing
policy issues facing us today require confronting the unknown and making difficult choices inthe face
of limited information."); Justin R. Pidot, Governance and Uncertainty, 37 CARDOZO L. REv. 113,
116 (2015) ("Lawmakers must act, even recognizing the limits of their knowledge, or else remain
forever paralyzed.").
4 The terms regulatory automation and automated regulation are used synonymously throughout
this Article.
5 See, e.g., ASCE: AM. SOC'Y OF Civ. ENG'RS, 2017 INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD: ENERGY
(2017), https://www.infrastucturereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Energy-Fina.pdf [https://
perma.cc/RQ92-JARE] (noting the fifty-year life expectancy of transmission and distribution lines).
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that an unprecedented rate of disruptive innovations, from hydraulic fracturing
to solar power, to electric vehicles, and it becomes clear why energy policymakers were among the first to experiment with regulations that automatically
adjust to changing circumstances.6
Perhaps the best-known example of such automated regulation is the fuelprice adjustment clause used to automatically adapt a regulated utility's retail
rates to changes in the price of coal, natural gas, and other fuel inputs. 7 Other,
more complex, mechanisms tie the level of financial incentives for emerging
clean energy technologies to the observed pace of deployment. When deployment falls short of desired levels, incentives automatically increase and, conversely, decrease to slow down faster-than-expected deployment. These and
other manifestations of regulatory automation often serve as insurance for policy-makers concerned with crafting policies based on assumptions about the
future that reality may prove inaccurate.
Unlike its heir-apparent algorithmic governance, automated regulation has
received surprisingly little scholarly attention to date." Historically, policymakers have used regulatory automation primarily to counter the negative effects
that lengthy administrative processes would have on regulated industries. Existing scholarship and judicial precedent debate the efficiency of self-adjusting
regulations and their fit within the administrative state, but they fail to offer a
holistic assessment ofthe virtues and vices of regulatory automation. This Article seeks to close that gap, assessing the political economy of automated regulation, its implications for public choice theory, and the proper relationship
between self-adjusting governance instruments and competitive markets,
among others. What emerges from this analysis is a first conceptualization of
the normative theory of regulatory automation. From a policy perspective, this
normative assessment suggests that, properly designed and implemented, selfadjusting regulations offer significant benefits to policy-makers and stakeholders, extending well beyond their traditionally emphasized function as insurance
against forecast errors.
This is not another article on algorithmic governance. I merely reference
it as one point along the broad spectrum of dehumanized, automated governance options. If anything, this Article cautions policy-makers to give more senous consideration to traditional methods of regulatory automation before
6
7

See infra notes 38-40, 45-46 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Joe H. Foy, CostAdjustment in UtilityRate Schedules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 663,664-65

(1960); Richard J. Pierce,Reconsideringthe Roles ofRegulation andCompetition in the NaturalGas
Industry, 97 HARV. L. REv. 345, 350 (1983); R.S. Trigg, EscalatorClauses in Public Utility Rate
Schedules, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 964, 964, 967, 972 (1958).
8 See, e.g., Pidot, supra note 3, at 168 (expressing surprise that automated regulation "has received so little attention").
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rushing into algorithmic governance, thereby burdening themselves and their
constituents with the many unresolved questions surrounding algorithmic due
process, privacy, and other concerns. 9
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I illustrates the appeal of selfadjusting regulatory regimes as insurance against forecasting errors in a fastchanging world, for energy policy and beyond.' 0 A comparison of global and
domestic energy forecasts with historic data going back thirty years reveals the
woeful inaccuracy ofthe expert predictions that inform policy-making around
the world. The impact of these forecasting errors is exacerbated by the capital
intensity and longevity of most energy assets, which combine to raise the risk
that poorly informed policy choices end up creating suboptimal, yet longlasting, path dependencies.
Part II introduces a representative sampling of self-adjusting regulatory
instruments in use today and proposes a coherent typology using the choice of
independent variable as the point of distinction." Historically, policy-makers
have mostly relied on the passage of time as catalyst for regulatory adaptation,
such as through a sunset clause or another time-related trigger for selfexecuting change. More recently, policy-makers have tethered automatic regulatory adjustments to more dynamic indicators like the pace of technology deployment and other market metrics.
Combining empiricism with qualitative analysis, Part III explores past,
present, and future challenges and opportunities to develop a normative theory
of regulatory automation.' 2 Critics and proponents alike claim to have efficiency arguments on their side. Closer scrutiny of the scholarly debate and empirical evidence suggests that, properly designed and implemented in the appropriate context, the benefits of automated regulation are likely to outweigh attendant costs. Opponents of regulatory automation frequently challenge its
compatibility with the procedural mandates of the administrative state. Yet,
more than one court has dismissed concerns about notice and hearing requirements as well as alleged shifts in the burden of proof, among other procedural

9See infra note 242 and accompanying text. See generallyDanielle Keats Citron, Technological
Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 1249 (2008) (proposing a new approachto protecting due process
that addresses advancements in automated decision-making systems in individual adjudication and
rulemaking procedures); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The ScoredSociety: Due Process
for AutomatedPredictions,89 WASH. L. REv. 1 (2014) (discussing the need for enhanced due process
protections amidst the increased use of artificial intelligence in credit reporting systems); Cary
Coglianese & David Lehr, TransparencyandAlgorithmic Governance, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2019)
(asserting that machine-learing algorithms are understandable to the public and that algorithmic
governance need not necessarily pose a threat to fair and transparent government).
10 See infra Part I.
" See infra Part II.
12 See infra Part III.
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objections. From a political economy perspective, regulatory automation
promises to foster more consensual policy-making as the ex ante consideration
of eventualities allows for greater accommodation of competing conceptions of
the future. Based on the tenets of public choice theory, finally, regulating on
autopilot has the potential to reduce the influence that special interests exert
upon the regulatory process. Part III concludes by offering policy-makers
guidance as to the proper scope of application for automated regulation and its
relationship with competitive markets.
Part IV situates automated regulation vis-i-vis algorithmic governance
powered by artificial intelligence.1 3 Both represent but two points, among
many, along a continuum of options for adaptive regulation and dehumanized
governance. Today's self-adjusting regulations are both less and more developed
than algorithmic governance. In terms oftechnical sophistication and mathematical complexity, deep-learning algorithms are lightyears ahead of the relatively
simple algebraic functions historically used to deliver automated regulatory
adaptation. These automated regulations, however, do resemble their more sophisticated algorithmic progeny insofar, as both seek to complement, if not
altogether replace, human decision-making with automated actions. Unlike the
emerging but as-yet largely theoretical concept of algorithmic governance, 14
dehumanized governance through self-adjusting regulation has long been a
reality. Over a century's worth of empirical evidence offers a rich track record
for policy-makers and scholars to mine for insights that can help inform the
future of algorithmic and other non-human decision-making and governance.
I. THE NEED FOR INSURANCE AGAINST FORECAST ERRORS
Predicting the future is easy; the hard part is getting it right, or so the saying goes. History is, indeed, replete with predictions of the future that have
turned out to be horribly wrong. Consider the following assessment of the
long-term appeal of television, offered by 20th Century Fox studio head Darryl
Zanuck in 1946: "[T]elevision won't be able to hold on to any market it captures after the first six months. . . . People will soon get tired of staring at a
plywood box every night."' 5 More than seventy years later, television remains
a fixture in the daily routine of most households, with the average American

" See infra Part IV.

14 See, e.g., Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 9, at 7 ("Today, most governmental applications of
machine learning are not determinative of final actions.").
15 Worst Tech PredictionsofAll Time: DarrylZanuck, 1946, THE TELEGRAPH
(June 29, 2016),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/0/worst-tech-predictions-of-all-time/darryl-zanuck-in-1964/
[https://perma.cc/Y3PW-VRDS].
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adult watching over five hours of television daily.1 6 Sure, televised content
may be moving away from traditional networks and into online streaming formats, but consumers do not seem to tire of staring at "plywood boxes" and
their progeny, including flat-screen TVs, tablets, and smartphones.
The following verdict, from a 1966 article in Time Magazine, on the viability of remote shopping has proven similarly off the mark, and notjust for its
sexist undertone: "remote shopping, while entirely feasible, will flop-because
women like to get out of the house, like to handle the merchandise, like to be
able to change their minds."' 7 Half a century later, online shopping is pushing
more and more traditional retailers out of business.' 8 Led by Amazon, Alibaba,
eBay, and others, the e-commerce retail industry accounted for $3.5 trillion in
sales globally in 2019.19
Forecasts from industry insiders, even when offered for significantly
shorter timeframes, have not fared much better, as demonstrated by the 2007
skepticism of Microsoft's then-CEO Steve Ballmer regarding the market appeal ofApple's iPhone: "There's no chance that the iPhone is going to get any
significant market share."2 Within one year of its release, Apple's gadget went

16 See, e.g., John Koblin, How Much Do We Love TV? Let Us Count the Ways, N.Y. TI MEs (June
30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/business/media/nielsen-survey-media-viewing.htil
[https://penna.cc/8LJU-NF2A].
17 The Futurists: Looking Toward A.D. 2000, Essay, TIME, Feb. 25, 1966, at 28, 29, http://
content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,835128-5,00.htinl [https://perma.cc/K6Y4-PERE].
" One of the most prominent early victims of the online retail revolution was Borders, a fortyyear-old chain of bookstores. See Julie Bosman & Michael J. de la Merced, BordersFilesforBankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/borders-files-forbankruptcy [https://perma.cc/6BJT-HURV]. The recent bankruptcy ofbrick-and-mortar retailer Mattress Firm suggests that evenbulky, harder-to-deliver merchandise that was traditionally subject to intense in-store testing and comparison, is no longer safe from the online retail revolution. See Nathan
Bomey, MattressFirmFilesfor Chapter11 Bankruptcy Protection, Will Close up to 700 Stores, USA
TODAY (Oct. 5,2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/10/05/mattress-firm-chapter- 1bankruptcy/1532218002/ [https://perma.cc/66EF-RTHK]. The COVID-19 pandemic has further accelerated this trend, with online retail sales more than doubling between the spring of 2019 and 2020.
See Louis Columbus, How COVID-19 Is Transforming E-commerce, FORBES (Apr. 28, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2020/04/28/how-covid-19-is-transforming--commerce/
#44bdc7763544 [https://perma.cc/74W7-6V9J].
19 See Daniela Coppola, GlobalRetailE-commerce Sales 2015-2023, STATISTA (Nov. 26, 2020),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/534123/e-commerce-share-of-retail-sales-worldwide/ [https://perma.
cc/Z6KB-28M9]. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, online retail numbers are likely to be significantly higher for 2020.
' David Lieberman, CEO Forum: Microsoft'sBallmerHavinga "GreatTime," USA TODAY (Apr.
29,2007), https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/2007-04-29-ballmer-ceoforum-usatN.htm [https://perma.cc/DUT7-SXP2].
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on to capture nearly 13% of the global smartphone market, vastly exceeding
Ballmer's prediction of 2% to 3% of the market share.'
Even a bona fide genius, operating within their domain of expertise, can
be dismally wrong in predicting the future, as evidenced by Albert Einstein's
1932 assessment of the technological viability of nuclear power: "[T]here is
not the slightest indication that [nuclear] energy will ever be obtainable. That
would mean that the atom would have to be shattered at will."22 A mere decade
later, a team of scientists led by Italian physicist Enrico Fermi achieved the
first self-sustaining nuclear reaction, turning the alleged pipe dream of nuclear
fission into technological reality. 23 Today, nuclear power accounts for nearly
one-fifth of all electricity generation in the United States. 24
If even industry insiders and certified geniuses are this far off the mark in
their predictions, how can we possibly expect policy-makers to anticipate what
the future holds? The good news is that, at least in the energy domain, hordes
of analysts have devoted themselves to forecasting future trends and developments, often on an annual basis. The not-so-good news is that their track record is less than reassuring. In fact, a comparison of past predictions with historical reality suggests that highly trained analysts using vast data sets and
state-of-the-art modeling techniques fare little better than a fortune teller reading tea leaves.
In some instances, forecasts may be guided not only by the data available,
but also by the issuing entity's vested interests and place in the energy economy. This would explain why the energy outlook publications periodically released by oil companies, such as ExxonMobil, British Petroleum, and Royal
Dutch Shell, have come under attack for consistently underestimating future
growth in solar, wind, and other renewables that threaten the fossil fuel industry's business interests.2 6 ExxonMobil's 2005 Energy Outlook, for example,
2 See Robert Palmer, iPhone TriplesMarket Share as ofQ3 2008, ENGADGET (Dec. 4, 2008),
https://www.engadget.com/2008/12/04/iphone-triples-market-share-in-q3-2008/ [https://penna.cc/
Q4V5-F5WK].
" Victor Navasky, Tomorrow Never Knows, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 29, 1996, at 216, https://www.
nytimes.com/1996/09/29/magazine/tomorrow-never-knows.htil [https://perma.cc/BYR4-HDG4].
2 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 6-9, https://www.
energy.gov/sites/prod/files/The%/`20History%/`20Ofo2ONuclear%/`20Energy_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4Q39-NXWX].
24 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2019 WITH PROJECTIONS TO
2050, at 21 (2019), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/aeo2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XDMDJ44].
25 See infra notes 32-35, 41-43 and accompanying
text.

26

See, e.g., GREGMUTTITT, OIL CHANGE INT'L & GREENPEACE, FORECASTING FAILURE: WHY
INVESTORS SHOULD TREAT OIL COMPANY ENERGY FORECASTS WITH CAUTION 8 (2017), http://

priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2017/03/Forecasting-Failure-oil-company-outlooks.pdf [https://perma.
cc/SB58-7TYX] (questioning the plausibility and accuracy of oil companies' forecast of future energy
trends).
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projected that wind and solar would account for one percent of global energy
generation by 2030. In reality, wind and solar reached this share in 2012, eighteen years ahead of ExxonMobil's predicted schedule.2 1 Critics point out that,
despite being presented as objective expert assessments, many company forecasts are, in fact, more advocacy than analysis. 28
Luckily for policy-makers, there is no shortage of publicly funded energy
analysts, such as those responsible for the energy outlooks released by the International Energy Agency and the U.S. Energy Information Administration
(EIA). Going back to a mandate included in the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977,29 the EIA's Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) projects future
supply, demand, and resources for energy and electricity in the United States.30
As the federal government's chief energy forecast, AEO projections are widely
relied upon by industry and policy-makers alike.3 ' So how accurate are these
projections? Ifthe large number of peer-reviewed publications devoted to forecast errors in the AEOs is any indication, the EIA's projections leave much to
be desired in terms of accuracy. 32 Indeed, several commentators warn of systematic bias in the EIA's projections. 33 Others decry that, based on a compaison of past forecasts with historical data, "far less confidence should have been
placed on past AEO forecasts than was claimed by the forecasters." 34 The same
commentators go on to caution that "it is prudent to apply the same scepticism
to current and future AEO forecasts." 31

Id. at 2.
Id. at 15.
29 Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352).
* See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 24, at 4.
3 See Alexander Q. Gilbert & Benjamin K. Sovacool, Looking the Wrong Way: Bias, Renewable
Electricity, andEnergy Modelling in the United States, 94 ENERGY 533, 534 (2016).
3 See, e.g., Maximilian Auffhammer, The Rationality ofEIA Forecasts Under Symmetric and
Asymmetric Loss, 29 RES. & ENERGY ECON. 102, 119-20 (2007); Carolyn Fischer et al., Under2

2

standingErrorsin EIA ProjectionsofEnergy Demand, 31 RES. & ENERGY EcON. 198, 199 (2009);

Gilbert & Sovacool, supra note 31, at 540; George M. Lady, Evaluating Long Term Forecasts, 32
ENERGY ECON. 450, 450-51 (2010); Alexander I. Shlyakhter et al., Quantifying the Credibility of
Energy ProjectionsfromTrends in PastData: The USEnergy Sector, 22 ENERGYPOL'Y 119, 124-25

(1994). Additionally, the International Energy Agency's (IEA) projections are met with similar levels
of criticism in the literature. See, e.g., Luisa F. Cabeza et al., Comparison ofPast Projectionsof
GlobalandRegionalPrimaryandFinalEnergy Consumptionwith HistoricalData,82 RENEWABLE
& SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS. 681, 682-83 (2018); Hua Liao et al., Why Didthe HistoricalEnergy
ForecastingSucceed or Fail?:A Case Study on IEA 's Projection, 107 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC.

CHANGE 90, 95 (2016).
" See, e.g., Fischeret al., supra note 32, at 199-200; Gilbert & Sovacool, supra note 31, at 54041.
3

Shlyakhter et al., supra note 32, at 125.

3 Id.
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It is to the EIA's credit that the agency issues an annual retrospective,
comparing its past AEO forecasts dating back to 1994 to actual data. 36 Unfortunately, the AEO Retrospective is limited to some twenty high-level data
points, and for example, omits data specific to renewables and other emerging
technologies. Still, two trends emerge: first, the EIA does a betterjob of forecasting energy consumption than other indicators, likely because consumption
is fairly inelastic and tends to change more slowly; 37 second, supply-side data

reveal the agency's general inability to predict technological innovation and
disruption. The most poignant example of this dynamic is the EIA's complete
failure to anticipate the transformative effect that directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing would have on the U.S. energy economy. 38 Failing to account for the oil-and-gas boom facilitated by fracking in shale plays across the
country, the EIA had erroneously expected the United States to remain a net
importer of fossil fuels for decades to come. As a result, the agency's projections
on natural gas imports missed the mark by nearly three hundred percent.39 Such
dramatic forecast errors have implications far beyond the circles of a few disgruntled academics. Relying on EIA projections, for example, industry majors
commissioned dozens of terminals, at a cost of billions of dollars, to import
liquefied natural gas via supertankers from the Middle East and elsewhere,
only to abandon most of these projects when hydraulic fracturing obviated the
need for foreign natural gas."
The EIA's forecasting fares even worse when turning from fossil fuels to
renewables. In its 2000 AEO reference case scenario, for instance, the agency
projected that by 2020 non-hydroelectric renewables would account for 3.10%

36

See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK (AEO) RETROSPECTIVE
REVIEW: EVALUATION OF AE02018 AND PREVIOUS REFERENCE CASE PROJECTIONS 1, 2 (2018),

https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/retrospective/pdf/retrospective.pdf [https://pera.cc/TTY9-PAUX].
17 Id. at 2.
8 For a thoughtful introduction to the regulatory challenges and transformational effects of hydraulic fracturing, see JohnM. Golden & Hannah J. Wiseman, The FrackingRevolution: Shale Gas as
a Case Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L.J. 955, 983-1000 (2015); David B. Spence,
Federalism,Regulatory Lags, and the PoliticalEconomy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV.

431, 477-506 (2013).
'9 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 36, at 3.
41 In the mid-2000s, analysts (falsely) anticipated that imported liquefied natural gas (LNG) could
account for more than one-fifth of U.S. consumption. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIQUEFIED NATURAL
GAS (LNG) IN U.S. ENERGY POLICY: INFRASTRUCTURE AND MARKET ISSUES 5 (2006), https://www.
everycrsreport.com/files/2006013_RL32386_bc179dca9098af9ba02579d24d0bbe6f87410203.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H9C6-CQ8A]. For a snapshot of the general exodus from LNG import terminals
following the advent of hydraulic fracturing, see U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NORTH AMERICA LNG
IMPORT TERMINALS, https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/LNG%/`20Import%`20O26%
20Export%/o2OTerminal%/`20Maps%/`2012-18-2012.pdf[https://penna.cc/B5C3-KWLW] (diagraming
the evolution of North American LNG import terminals).
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of the nation's electricity generation. 4 1 A more optimistic "high renewables
case" raised this share to a daring 4.6%.42 As of year-end 2018, two years before the close of the EIA's projection period, non-hydro renewables had already vastly exceeded even the most optimistic AEO forecast, fueling 10.8%
of U.S. electricity generation.43 The agency's skepticism of renewables is best
illustrated by its expectation that "[l]ess than 400 megawatts of renewable generating capacity is expected to be built after 2012."44 In reality, nearly 16,000
megawatts of new wind and solar capacity were added in 2015 alone,45 forty
times the capacity additions the EIA had projected for all non-hydro renewables over a period of eight years. Once again, the EIA's woefully inaccurate
projections create serious real-world problems, particularly for grid operators
tasked with maintaining the electricity system's delicate balance between demand and supply to ensure reliable electric service. Successful integration of a
growing share of weather-dependent solar- and wind-powered generators,
whose output varies by season and time of day, requires advance planning to
ensure necessary upgrades to physical infrastructure and market rules, among
others.46 The recent proliferation of renewable generation infrastructure took
even industry insiders relying on the EIA's conservative projections by surprise, making the transition to a low-carbon U.S. electricity sector more complicated than necessary.
In light of such a dismal forecasting track record, policy-makers could be
forgiven for choosing to ignore expert projections altogether. To do so, however, would obscure the fact that policy-makers themselves are often making the
41 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2000 WITH PROJECTIONS
TO
2020, at 72 (1999), https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=15936 [https://penna.cc/7496-AY32].
42 Id.
43
Forthe data underlyingthis calculation, see U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., APRIL 2019 MONTHLY
ENERGY REVIEW 125, https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/archive/00351904.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZZ9V-M65B]. More recent data suggests sustained growth in renewables deployment. See

U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., OCTOBER 2020 MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 130, https://www.eia.gov/

-

totalenergy/data/monthly/archive/00352010.pdf [https://perna.cc/6ZYA-NVKM].
" U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 41, at 72.
4 For background on the 7,286 megawatts of new solar capacity installed in 2015, see Press Release, Solar Energy Indus. Ass'n, U.S. Solar Market Sets New Record, Installing 7.3 GW of SolarPV
in 2015 (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.seia.org/news/us-solar-market-sets-new-record-installing-73
gw-solar-pv-2015 [https://perna.cc/WAJ9-NVRK]. Forbackground onthe 8,599 megawatts ofnew
wind capacity installed in 2015, see Wind Energy in the United States, AWEA: AM. WIND ENERGY
ASS'N, https://www.awea.org/wind-101/basics-of-wind-energy/wind-facts-at-a-glance [https://penna.
cc/SV66-LWZT] (click the "2015" bar on the "Cumulative U.S. Wind Capacity" bar chart to view the
underlying data referenced).
46 The considerable challenge of balancing increasing amounts of variable renewable power generators with other resources has been vividly illustrated in a graphic known as the "duck chart" for its
unusual shape. See CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, WHAT THE DUCK CURVE TELLS Us ABOUT

MANAGING A GREEN GRID 3 fig.2 (2016), http://www.caiso.com/documents/flexibleresourceshelp
renewables_fastfacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/93BX-KVPP].
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forecasters' lives more difficult. The huge gap between the EIA's conservative
projections and the actual data, for instance, is partly the product of profound
changes to the policy landscape supporting renewable energy in the United
States. As the 2000 AEO was going to print, federal tax credit support for wind
power had just expired, and the EIA's projections assumed state-level policy
support only for renewables going forward.47 Little did the agency know that
solar, wind, and other renewables would enjoy generous federal tax breaks,
including tax credits and accelerated depreciation, for most of the forecast pe-

riod.4 8
All sectors of the economy respond to the presence (or withdrawal) of
public policy support. With its unusually dense regulatory framework, however, the U.S. energy economy appears particularly sensitive to changes in its
policy landscape. Consider the well-documented impact that federal regulation
at the wellhead has had on the supply of natural gas, causing severe shortages
and annual losses of billions of dollars in social welfare. 49 At the other end of
the spectrum, many commentators have identified the deregulation of energy
markets as a major contributor to the 2000 to 2001 California energy crisis,
also responsible for billions of dollars in social welfare losses.5 The infamous
boom-and-bust cycles resulting from periodic lapses and renewals of the production tax credit for wind between 2000 and 2016 offer more recent evidence
of the energy industry's sensitivity to policy change.5
At this point, it should be clear why policy-makers face a particularly
steep challenge when trying to anticipate, let alone predict, future developments in the energy domain. On the one hand, the sector's heightened sensitivity to changes in policy and regulation creates a serious endogeneity problem. On the other hand, the energy industry is far from immune to change triggered by exogenous factors, as evidenced by the series oftechnology and busi47 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 41,
48 For a discussion of the federal tax incentives for

at 71.

renewables in general, and a critique of the
inefficiencies of tax credits in particular, see Felix Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits:Smarter Tax Policy

for a Cleaner, More Democratic Energy Future, 31
49

YALE J. ON REGUL. 303, 311-23 (2014).
See, e.g., Pierce,supra note 7, at 371-72 (discussing the gas shortages and associated welfare

losses resulting from natural gas regulation). For a detailed account of the first twenty years of regulation of natural gas production, see STEPHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W. MACAVOY, ENERGY
REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 56-88 (1974). For the (flawed) reasoning underlying the original mandate to regulate natural gas producers, see PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,
347 U.S. 672, 676-77, 685 (1954).
5 For a thoughtful engagement with the factors contributing to the California energy crisis, see
Timothy P. Duane,Regulation'sRationale: Learningfrom the CaliforniaEnergy Crisis, 19 YALE J.
ON REGUL. 471, 507-17 (2002). See generally Mike Stenglein, The Causes of California'sEnergy
Crisis, 16 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 237 (2002) (exploring the history of deregulation in California's energy
market and the factors that led to its energy crisis).
51 See Mormann, supra note 48, at
319.
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ness innovations that have disrupted the U.S. energy economy in recent
years-from hydraulic fracturing52 to electric vehicles, 53 from solar photovoltaics and other renewables 54 to advanced metering infrastructure.5 5
To make matters worse, not only is the challenge itself formidable, the
stakes, too, are higher than in many other industries. That is because power
plants, pipelines, and many other energy assets have a useful life of forty years
or more. 56 As policy-makers rely on (often flawed) projections about the future
to craft policies and regulations for the next generation of energy assets, they
commit the industry to a specific course. As new, better data becomes available, that course cannot be corrected, much less reversed without imposing considerable costs on utilities, ratepayers, and other stakeholders."
Faced with the daunting, high-stakes task of anticipating the future armed
with expert forecasts of, at best, dubious accuracy, energy policy-makers are
increasingly embracing self-adjusting regulation as an insurance policy against
forecast errors. Having established the general motivation for auto-adjusting
regulation, it is time to explore its real-world implementation. The next Part of
this Article surveys a representative sampling of self-adjusting energy regulation at the U.S. federal and state levels.

See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., AlexandraB. Klass, Public Utilitiesand TransportationElectrification,104 IOWAL.
REv. 545, 547 (2019) (noting that the transportation sector's ongoing electrification "will transform
the automobile industry, the use of electricity on a broad scale and, as a result, our modem world").
5 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text; see also Emily Kaldjian & Priya Barua, The US
Underwent a Quiet Clean Energy Revolution Last Year, WORLD RES. INST. BLOG (Jan. 23, 2019),
https://www.wri.org/blog/2019/0 1/us-underwent-quiet-clean-energy-revolution-last-year [https://
penna.cc/57A3-RH68] (taking stock of soaring corporate demand for renewable energy and municipal
clean energy pledges, among other changes).
5 See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, SmartRegulationandFederalismforthe Smart Grid, 37 HARV. ENV'T
L. REv. 1, 10-21 (2013) (describing the challenges and opportunities associated with smart meters
and other advanced metering infrastructure); Joel B. Eisen & Felix Mormann, Free Trade in Electric
Power, 2018 UTAH L. RV. 49, 93-97 (assessing ongoing reforms to the utility business model in
California and New York, made possible by advanced metering infrastructure).
56 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, 82
BROOK. L. REv. 645, 650-63 (2017) (discussing the challenges surrounding the stranded costs associated with utility investments made obsolete by a changing regulatory landscape); see also Alexandra
B. Klass, Future-ProofingEnergy TransportLaw, 94 WASH. U. L. REv. 827, 830 (2017) (noting the
tension among sunk costs, path dependency, and clean energy development at a time of growing concern over climate change and newly accessible abundant domestic fossil fuel reserves); Amy L. Stein,
Breaking Energy Path Dependencies, 82 BROOK. L. REv. 559, 559-64 (2017) (offering a survey of
the rich literature on path dependency and its application to the U.S. energy sector).
52
5
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II. AUTOMATED REGULATION IN PRACTICE: AN ENERGY CASE STUDY

Dynamic regulation, in general, and automated, self-adjusting regulation,
in particular, can take many forms. One might even go so far as to posit that all
regulation entails some degree of dynamism, subject to the effort and process
required to make adjustments. With their stringent substantive and procedural
reform requirements, we might place constitutional provisions near the starting
point of such a dynamism continuum. Self-adjusting automated regulation,
with or without the use of artificial intelligence and smart algorithms, would be
located closer to the end point of this continuum. Nestled between these two extremes, we would find the multiverse of approaches to adaptive regulation that
pre-commit policy-makers to revisit, and possibly modify, their regulatory work
product on a periodic basis to facilitate iterative learning and adjustment.58
Framing the dynamism of regulations solely in terms oftheir amenability
to formal adjustments, however, would ignore the reality that policy-makers
frequently use language that allows for evolving interpretation, and hence, application of a given provision without the need for formal revisions. To illustrate this informal dimension of dynamism, consider the pervasive use of technology standards for purposes of pollution control in environmental law. 9 As
technology evolves, so does the regulator's interpretation of what constitutes

5'

For a snapshot of the literature on adaptive approaches to regulation based

on repeat human

intervention, across a range of substantive contexts, see generally Rosie Cooney & Andrew T.F. Lang,
Taking UncertaintySeriously:Adaptive Governance andInternationalTrade, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 523

(2007) (discussing the benefits of adaptive governance in the face of uncertainty by analyzing the
effectiveness of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) measures to combat the spread of invasive
species); Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, DesigningAdministrativeLawforAdaptive Management,
67 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2014) (asserting that adaptive management, though not appropriate for all agency decision-making, offers significant promise for specific areas of administrative law); Holly
Doremus, Adaptive Management as an InformationProblem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455 (2011) (rejecting

the presumption of adaptive management's benefits and calling for a more rigorous analysis to inform
decisions on whether to use adaptive management); Zachary J. Gubler, ExperimentalRules, 55 B.C.
L. REV. 129 (2014) (advocating for policy-makers' use of "experimental rules" to better address uncertainty and arguing for greater deference from courts towards such rules to promote theiruse); J.B.
Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. ScI. & TECH. 21 (2005)
(examining the shortcomings of the implementation of adaptive management frameworks like the
Endangered Species Act's Habitat Conservation Plan program and proposing measures for better
deployment of adaptive management principles).
59 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (mandating the use of "the best technology available" in the
context of thermal discharges under the Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4)(D) (requiring use
of "the best technology, treatment techniques and other means which the Administrator finds ...
available" under the Safe Drinking Water Act); id § 7411(g)(4) (setting forth the Clean Air Act's
technology-based standards of performance for new stationary sources).
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"the best available control technology," even though the underlying statutory
provision has remained unchanged for decades.60
To complicate matters further, the literature has yet to converge on a common terminology for regulatory adaptation. Justin Pidot was among the first to
propose a comprehensive typology that distinguishes between "static law" and
"dynamic law," the latter comprised of durational, adaptive, and contingent regulations. 6' In their working paper, Lori Bennear and Jonathan Wiener differentiate
between automated and discretionary types of adaptive regulation.62 This Article's working definition of automated regulation encompasses durational as well
as contingent approaches per Pidot and maps neatly with Bennear and Wiener's
definition of automated adaptive regulation. Within automated regulation, I distinguish two general classes, based on the independent variable or metric that
triggers a regulation to adapt. In the first class of automated regulations, change
occurs as a relatively straightforward function of time. 63 The second class uses
more dynamic market-based factors as the trigger for regulatory adjustment.64
A. Time-Sensitive Regulatory Automation
Perhaps the most basic example oftime-triggered automated regulation is
that of a sunset clause incorporated to terminate a statute, provision, program,
or agency at a specified date.65 The addition of an expiration date can serve a
variety of purposes. In some cases, it indicates the regulator's awareness that
the provision in question is of an experimental nature and that its impact and
utility should be revisited atthe end ofatrial period.66 In other cases, the regulator gives finite life to regulations because of budgetary motives, such as to
60 See, e.g., Alaska Dep't of Env't Conservationv. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 468-70,472 (2004) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4)) (illustrating the dynamic interpretation of technology standards for air
pollution control and their sensitivity to technological progress).

61See Pidot, supra note 3, at 140-41.
62 See generallyLori S. Bennear & Jonathan B. Wiener, Adaptive Regulation: InstrumentChoice
for Policy Learning Over Time (Working Paper, 2019), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/
files/centers/mrcbg/files/Regulationo20O -%20adaptive%20reg'o20-o20Bennearo20Wienero20on
%20Adaptive%20Reg%20Instrum/o2OChoice%/`202019%/`2002%/`2012%/`20clean.pdf [https://penna.
cc/TWM4-T5CN].
63 See discussioninfra Part II.A.
64 See discussioninfra Part II.B.
65 For an introduction to the historic roots and continued prevalence of sunset clauses,
see, for
example, Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 247, 249-61 (2007). In the
United States, sunset clauses have been particularly popular as limitations on the continued existence
of government agencies. See, e.g., Dan R. Price, SunsetLegislation in the UnitedStates, 30 BAYLOR
L. REv. 401, 401 (1978); Anthony R. Licata, Note, Zero-Base SunsetReview, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
505, 506-16 (1977).
66 For a thoughtful discussion of the challenges and opportunities of experimental legislation and
regulation, see Sofia Ranchord6s, Sunset Clausesand ExperimentalRegulations: Blessing or Curse
for Legal Certainty?, 36 STATuTE L. REV. 28, 38-44 (2015).
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limit the burden on American taxpayers imposed by tax breaks. 67 Finally, sunset provisions can reflect the regulator's anticipation of a future change in circumstances that calls into question the continued utility of an initially warranted piece of legislation or regulation. 68 It is this last use of sunset clauses that
policy-makers resort to in their quest for insurance against flaws in the forecasts and assumptions that inform their regulatory choices.
The Section 1603 cash grant for renewable energy assets, first created under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), 69 illustrates this dynamic. When the financial crisis of 2008 to 2009 led most banks,
insurance companies, and other tax equity investors to pull out of renewable
energy, 70 Congress included a special cash subsidy in its ARRA stimulus package to keep the then-fledgling solar and wind industries afloat. 7 1At the time,
federal legislators were unsure how severe and long-lasting the economic
downturn caused by the financial crisis would be. Thus, they endowed the Section 1603 grant, adopted as part of a temporary relief package, 72 with a oneyear sunset clause. 73 When, one year later, the economy in general and the re67 For an intriguing account of the complex relationship between sunset clauses and budget
constraints, including the so-called Byrd Rule, see Alli Sutherland, Note, Ghosting in Tax Law: Sunset
Provisions and Their Unfaithfulness, 46 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 479, 493-95 (2019); see also
Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The PoliticalEconomy of Sunset Provisionsin the Tax Code,
40 GA. L. REv. 335, 402-06 (2006) (analyzing sunset provisions within the context of tax policy and
concluding that the provisions exacerbate special interest-driven inefficiencies in government).
68 See Rebecca M. Kysar, Dynamic Legislation, 167 U. PA. L. REv. 809, 824 (2018) (referring to
sunset clauses as a type of "prompting" instrument designed to induce later legislative or regulatory
action).
69 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1603, 123 Stat. 115,
364-66 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 48).
70 Between 2007 and 2009, the market for tax equity, required to benefit from federal tax incentives for solar, wind, and other renewables, contracted by over 8%, from $6.1 billion in 2007 to $1.2

billion in 2009. See BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., REASSESSING RENEWABLE ENERGY SUBSIDIES: ISSUE

&

BRIEF 10 (2011), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BPCRE-Issue-Brief_322.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJW9-9LKM].
71 Specifically, the Section 1603 cash grant gave eligible renewable energy developers the option
to receive a cash grant from the Department of Treasury forup to 30% of their qualifying costs in lieu
of their traditional production or investment tax credits. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, PAYMENTS
FOR SPECIFIED ENERGY PROPERTY IN LIEU OF TAX CREDITS UNDER THE AMERICAN RECOVERYAND
REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009, at 5 (2011), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/recovery/Documents/
B/o2oGuidance%`203 -29-11%/o20revised%/o20(2)%/`2oclean.pdf [https://penna.cc/TY4U-TBNU].
72 The official title of AmericanRecovery and Reinvestment Act's closely related Section 1705,
"Temporary Program for Rapid Deployment of Renewable Energy and Electric Power Transmission
Projects," reflects the program's temporary nature. See § 1705, 123 Stat. at 145 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 16516) (expired 2011)).
71 See § 1603, 123 Stat. at 302 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 48). For a critical assessment of
Section 1603 grant's impact onjob creation, see Memorandum from the Subcomm. on Oversight
Investigations Majority Staff, Comm. on Energy & Com. on Where Are the Jobs? The Elusiveness
of Job Creation Under the Section 1603 Grant Program for Renewable Energy to Members, Energy,
and Commerce Committee 3 (June 18, 2012), https://republicans-energycommerce.house.gov/sites/
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newables industry in particular continued to struggle, Congress extended the
Section 1603 cash grant by another year as part of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010."4
Other manifestations of time-sensitive automated regulation offer greater
nuance than the binary "on/off' switch of sunset clauses. The Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2016 (CAA), 7 5 for example, not only gave solar and
wind an extra five years of federal tax credit support; it also provided for a
gradual phase-down of the value of these tax incentives. Congress scheduled
the production tax credit for wind 76 to phase down in twenty percent increments annually starting in 2017 before phasing out altogether at the end of
2019.77 The investment tax credit for solar is similarly slated to phase down,
albeit in slightly smaller annual increments, starting in 2020 and bottoming out
at ten percent of qualifying expenditures for commercial installations, while
going away entirely for residential installations, both at the end of 2021.7"
A schedule of gradual reductions in the value of public policy support,
such as that included in the CAA, reflects policy-makers' attempts to anticipate
technology learning, cost improvements, and other market developments in the
pertinent industries. To the same end, policy-makers outside the United States
have long included standard annual degression rates in their support programs
for emerging energy technologies. 79 Such time-sensitive triggers for automated
regulation, however, rarely amount to more than a crude approximation of future industry development. After all, even the most nuanced time-sensitive
regulation assumes that change occurs at a linear, predictable pace that can be

republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/analysis/20120618greenjobs.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ECZGBZZ].
74 Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-312, § 707, 124 Stat. 3296, 3312 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 48).
75 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, §§ 301-304, 129 Stat. 2242,
3038-40 (2015) (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 25D, 45, 48).
76 See § 301, 129 Stat. at 3038 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 45).
?? See Felix Monnann, Fadinginto the Sunset: Solar and Wind Energy Get Five More Years of
Tax Creditswith a Phase-down, 47 TRENDS 9, 9-11 (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
environment energy resources/publications/trends/20 15-2016/may-june-20 16/fading into the
sunset/ [https://perma.cc/B3LU-HKX2] (discussing the most recent extension of tax credits forwind
and solar, along with their eventual phasing down and out).
78 See I.R.C. § 25D (stating homeowner's personal tax credit for residential properties); id. § 48
(stating the investment tax credit for commercial solar properties).
79 See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-in Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. VA. L. REV.
937, 949, 954-57 (2014) (describing Germany's inclusion of standard degression rates in its feed-in
tariffs to promote solar, wind, and other renewables, beginning in the year 2000); see also MIGUEL
MENDON2A ET AL., POWERING THE GREEN ECONOMY: THE FEED-IN TARIFF HANDBOOK 49 (2009)

(suggesting that policy-makers set degression rates based on the slope of a technology's learning
curve with higher degression rates for solar photovoltaics and other technologies with more rapidly
declining costs).
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captured through gradual adaptation overtime. In reality, industries, technologies, and markets change in response to a much more complex mix of factors.
In the context of emerging energy technologies, for example, technology learning and cost improvements are primarily a function of deployment and attendant economies of scale, not the mere passage of time.80 Accordingly, policy-makers seeking to brace for future industry trends without the gamble of
committing to a specific timeline-a timeline often (mis)informed by expert
forecasts of dubious accuracy-are better off turning to market-based factors
as the trigger for regulatory adaptation.
B. Market-Sensitive Regulatory Automation
Once policy-makers decide to replace the passage of time with a marketbased trigger for regulatory adaptation, they must determine which market indicator, or mix of indicators, best captures the changing circumstances to
which their regulatory regime shall adjust. A policy-maker concerned with the
impact of macro-economic developments on its programs, for instance, may
choose to incorporate automatic adjustments based on overall inflation. The
federal production tax credit for wind power has been subject to such inflation
indexing since its inception.8 1 First created under the Energy Policy Act of
199282 with a value of fifteen dollars per megawatt-hour of wind-powered
electricity, a series of adjustments to account for general price inflation across
the U.S. economy have gradually increased the tax credit's value to twentyfive dollars per megawatt-hour as of 2020.83
0

" See, e.g., PATRICK HEARPS & DYLAN MCCONNELL, MELBOURNE ENERGY INST., RENEWABLE

ENERGY TECHNOLOGY COST REVIEW 7 (2011), https://cleanenergysolutions.org/pt-br/resources/
renewable-energy-technology-cost-review [https://perma.cc/XA4M-F7EZ] (noting the extreme importance of deployment in reducing cost). Gennan policy-makers learned a painful (and costly) lesson
when the country's solar incentives' standard degression rates failed to keep up with tumbling prices
for solar panels, inverters, and other hardware, following consolidation of the Chinese solar manufacturing industry in the early 2010s. See Felix Mormann et al., A Tale of Three Markets: Comparingthe
Renewable Energy Experiences of California, Texas, and Germany, 35 STAN. ENV'T L.J. 55, 97

(2016). Even the thoughtful suggestion to replace annual degression rates with monthly degression
rates, although more granular, attaches regulatory adaptation to the wrong independent variable. See
CLAIRE KREYCIK ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB'Y, INNOVATIVE FEED-IN TARIFF DESIGNS

THAT LIMIT POLICY COSTS 13-14 (2011), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy losti/50225.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LQ4U-23JV].
8 See I.R.C. § 451(b)(2).
8 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 and 42 U.S.C.).
8 For the production tax credit's most recent inflation adjustment, see Credit for Renewable Electricity Production, Refined Coal Production, and Indian Coal Production, and Publication of Inflation
Adjustment Factors and Reference Prices for Calendar Year 2020, 85 Fed. Reg. 28,698,28,699 (May
13, 2020). The $25 mark is the reference point for the phase-out calculations laid out in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016. See also supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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Of course, inflation indexing aggregates price changes across a multitude
of inputs at an economy-wide scale and, hence, paints with a broad brush. But
nothing prevents policy-makers from focusing on a specific input's price development, thereby using a scalpel rather than the proverbial axe to deliver
more tailored, automatic adjustments to their regulations. The paradigmatic
example of such a tailored approach to automated regulation is the fuel adjustment clause. For more than a century, utility regulators across the United
States have tethered rates for electricity and natural gas, among others, to the
price of specific fuel inputs. 8 4 First considered by a few pioneering state regulators in response to volatile prices for coal during World War I, automatic fuel
adjustment clauses quickly found a devout following, spreading to more than
forty states by 1960.85
To fully appreciate the value proposition of fuel adjustment clauses, one
must first understand the framework of rate regulation that has governed the
U.S. utility industry for most of the twentieth century and remains in force for
about half of the country today. 86 Historically, energy utility companies have
been subject to monopoly regulation, granting them an exclusive service territory in exchange for a universal duty to serve clients in that territory at rates
subject to the responsible state commission's regulatory approval.8 7 These rate
case proceedings require state regulators to probe into the utility's capital and
operating costs, historic and projected sales volume, and many other data
See Foy, supra note 7, at 664-65; Trigg, supra note 7, at 964.
See Foy, supra note 7, at 669, 671 (reporting that, in Texas alone, more than 400 municipalities
permitted automatic fuel adjustment clauses by 1960); see also R. Mark Isaac, Fuel CostAdjustment
84
85

Mechanisms and the Regulated Utility Facing Uncertain Fuel Prices, 13

BELL J. ECON. 158, 159

(1982) (noting that, by 1976, forty-three states featured fuel adjustment clauses in their utility regulation). For a snapshot of the proliferation of fuel adjustment clauses for natural gas, see City of Chicago
v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 150 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. 1958) (noting that, by the mid-1950s,
sixty-five gas distributing companies in twenty-six states had adjustment clauses in their rate schedules based on the cost of purchased gas).
86 For an overview of the varied state of regulation and restructuring in energy markets across the
United States, see generally STEVE ISSER, ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING IN THE UNITED STATES:
MARKETS AND POLICY FROM THE 1978 ENERGY ACT TO THE PRESENT (2015) (providing a comprehensive examination of the U.S. electricity industry's transfornation through economic, legal, regulatory, and political lenses). For a helpful visualization, see DeregulatedEnergy States & Markets,
ELEC. CHOICE, https://www.electricchoice.com/map-deregulated-energy-markets/ [https://perma.
cc/DEK4-JEYP] (2020). Notably, even in states that allow ratepayers a choice among various retail
electricity providers, delivery of electricity to the consumer is still monopoly-regulated using the timehonored process of rate cases.
87 For insightful accounts of the history of utility rate regulation, see Joel B. Eisen, FERC's
Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1797-1812 (2016);
Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contractin the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV.
141, 149-54 (2016); see also William Boyd, Just Price, Public Utility, and the Long History of
EconomicRegulation in America, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 721, 722 (2018) (tracing modemutility rate
regulation all the way back to the Aristotelian concept of corrective justice).

Boston College Law Review

20

[Vol. 62:1

points to arrive at a "just and reasonable" rate that balances the legitimate interests of consumers with those of the utility and its investors.""
Due to their data intensity and the need to reconcile a multitude of competing interests, rate cases have become notorious as a "time-consuming regulatory process, plagued by bureaucratic and administrative delay." 8 9 When fuel
costs go up, the resulting regulatory lag poses a serious threat to the cash flow
and, ultimately, financial viability of utilities, especially during times of rapid
inflation. 90 The hike in oil prices during the 1970s energy crisis illustrates this
dynamic with utilities' fuel expenditures nearly doubling from one year to the
next.91 Going through the normal process of applying to the state public utility
commission for approval of a rate increase, followed by a complex and potentially controversial rate case proceeding, a utility would have to wait months, if
not years, before being allowed to recover its increased fuel costs from consumers. Automated regulation through self-executing fuel adjustment clauses
offers a timely alternative to mitigate the negative consequences of regulatory
* 92
inertia.
The precise mechanics of fuel adjustment clauses vary across states and
utilities. 93 They all share a common denominator, however-a formulaic element that automatically adjusts the utility's revenue requirement as a function

8

See, e.g., FPC v. Hope Nat. Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) ("The rate-making process . .

i.e.,

the fixing of 'just and reasonable' rates, involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests."); see also James Ming Chen, Speculative Undertakings: Rate Regulation as a Branch of
CorporateFinance, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 779, 788-95 (2018) (describing utility ratemaking as a

variation on the financial theme of uncertainty).
89 Marshall A. Leaffer, Automatic FuelAdjustment Clauses: Time for a Hearing, 30 CASE W.

RSRV. L. REv. 228, 229 (1980); see also Foy, supra note 7, at 663 (discussingthe onerous complexity
of utility rate case proceedings); Shelley Welton & Joel Eisen, Clean Energy Justice: Charting an
Emerging Agenda, 43 HARV. ENV'T L. REv. 307, 322 (2019) (criticizing the "byzantine process"
before state public utility commissions and other governing bodies of the U.S. energy economy). Fora
comprehensive overview of utility regulation and the kaleidoscope of actors and competing interests,
see generally CARL PECHMAN, REGULATING POWER: THE ECONOMICS OF ELECTRICITY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (1993).
90 See David P. Baron & Raymond R. De Bondt, On the Design ofRegulatory PriceAdjustment
Mechanisms, 24 J. ECON. THEORY 70, 70 (1981); Pierce, supra note 7, at 373 ("[Fluel costs constitute

such a large proportion of a utility's total costs that any substantial regulatory lag in approving rate increases to reflect fuel cost increases can cause the rapid financial ruin of an otherwise healthy utility.").
91 See Leaffer, supra note 89, at 228 (reporting utility fuel costs of $6.7 billion for 1973, then
rising to $11.8 billion in 1974); see also Baron & De Bondt, supra note 90, at 71 (discussing the staggering volume of rate increases required between 1973 and 1976).
92

See, e.g., Leaffer, supra note 89, at 230 ("The automatic fuel adjustment clause . .

appears to

solve the cash flow dilemma resulting from regulatory lag and eliminates the public expense of
lengthy administrative hearings.").
9' See, e.g., Foy, supra note 7, at 673 (offering a snapshot of the variegated use of fuel adjustment
clauses across jurisdictions); Trigg, supra note 7, at 974.
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of its fuel expenditures and translates that adjustment into a higher (or lower)"4
rate. 95 The utility is then authorized to charge the new, adjusted rate to its customers without the need for regulatory approval from the state public utility
commission. 96A similar automatic mechanism is used, albeit less frequently, to
adjust utility rates to changes in applicable taxes. 97
The gradual shift away from coal-fired electricity generation, the advent of
hydraulic fracturing, and the increasing globalization ofnatural gas markets have
reduced the price volatility of fossil fuel inputs for U.S. utilities in recent years. 98
The proliferation of solar, wind, and other renewables with zero fuel costs on the
grid may, one day, altogether eliminate the need for automatic fuel adjustment
clauses. In the meantime, however, the rapid improvements and attendant cost
reductions in clean energy technologies present their own challenges for policymakers. If rapid inflation in fossil fuel prices made the case for fuel adjustment
clauses, 99 then rapid deflation in technology cost is making a persuasive argument for similarly automated regulation of clean energy incentives.
In electric transportation, for example, the cost of batteries-historically
accounting for the lion's share of a vehicle's production cost-has plummeted
in recent years. In 2015, the traction battery made up over 57% ofthe total cost
of a midsize car in the United States. As of early 2019, that number has
dropped to merely 33%, a staggering reduction over only four years.100 Federal
policy-makers have sought to anticipate these cost savings with a tiered phaseout of their tax incentives for electric vehicles.' 0 1 Following the conventional
wisdom that technology learning and cost improvements are a function of de-

94 It is worth pointing out that, in theory, fuel adjustment clauses are agnostic as to the direction
(upward or downward) in which a utility's rate is adjusted. Their characterization as "escalator
clause[s]" in parts of the literature is, strictly speaking, a mischaracterization, albeit one that captures
the more common application of these clauses. See Leaffer, supra note 89, at 231.
95 See Baron & De Bondt, supra note 90, at 71.
96 See, e.g., Foy, supra note 7, at 663 ("[A] provision which, without fonnal proceedings, increases or decreases utility rates in proportion to increases or decreases in an operating expense."); Leaffer,
supra note 89, at 230.
97

See William K. Jones,An Example ofa RegulatoryAlternative to Antitrust: New York Utilities

in the Early Seventies, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 462, 492 (1973); Trigg, supra note 7, at 965 n.6.
98 See, e.g., Henry Hub NaturalGas Spot Price, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.
gov/dnav/ng/hist/mgwhhdm.htm [https://penna.cc/S3AP-XN8P] (Dec. 16, 2020).
99 See Paul L. Joskow, Inflation andEnvironmentalConcern: StructuralChange in the Processof
Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J.L. & EcON. 291, 314 (1974) ("Rapid inflation had quickly

changed avery passive and inactive 'rate of return' regulatory process into avery active and continual
process of administrative rate of return review." (emphasis omitted)).
100
See Nathaniel Bullard, Opinion, Electric Vehicle Battery Shrinks andSo Does the Total Cost,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-12/electricvehicle-battery-shrinks-and-so-does-the-total-cost [https://perma.cc/8PKC-7EPT].
' See I.R.C. § 30D (West 2019) (codified at Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020,
Pub. L. No. 116-94, § 127(b), (c)(2)(B), 133 Stat. 2534, 3231-32 (2019)).
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ployment, more so than time, 102 the federal tax credit phases down to fifty percent once a manufacturer has sold 200,000 vehicles into the U.S. market,
dropping to 25% half a year later before disappearing altogether another six

months later. 103
Solar power technology has posed perhaps the greatest challenge for policy-makers seeking to keep their programs up to date with the latest industry
trends and development. That is because the dramatic cost reductions observed
in recent years have been the product not only of increased deployment and
attendant economies of scale, but also of other harder-to-predict drivers, such
as the consolidation process that followed a period of overproduction and cutthroat price competition among Chinese manufacturers of solar panels and
other equipment.10 4 Add to that geopolitically motivated price increases stemming from tariffs imposed as part of the "solar trade wars," 105 and it is easy to
appreciate the immense challenge for policy-makers trying to stay abreast of
the latest trends in this fast-changing industry.
The stakes are high. Failure to keep up can have disastrous consequences,
as illustrated by strong popular pushback against support schemes in Spain or
Germany-two former leaders in solar deployment that failed to keep up with
tumbling prices for solar photovoltaic equipment.106 The German public's
strong stance against fossil fuels and nuclear power, coupled with hastily implemented reductions in solar subsidies, allowed the country to continue on its
pro-renewables course.1 07 Spanish regulators, on the other hand, succumbed to
fierce popular backlash by first suspending, and, ultimately, dismantling their

102

See supra note 80 and accompanying text.

103 See I.R.C. § 30D(e)(2)-(3).
104 For an insightful account of the "ballooning of China-based solar manufacturers-Chinese
&

solar-manufacturing capacity," the resulting glut of solar modules and depressed prices, and the ensuing consolidation, see JEFFREY BALL ET AL., STAN. STEYER-TAYLOR CTR. FOR ENERGY POL'Y
FIN., THE NEW SOLAR SYSTEM: CHINA'S EVOLVING SOLAR INDUSTRY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
COMPETITIVE SOLAR POWER IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD 45 (2017), https://law.
stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/2017-03-20-Stanford-China-Report.pdf [https://penna.cc/
3N5U-32Y9].
105 For an account of the back-and-forth in tariffs and other trade sanctions imposed on solar
panels and other hardware, including related litigation before the WTO, see Monmann et al., supra
note 80, at 84 & n.145.
106 See, e.g., Nora Bonatz et al., A Comparative Study of the Interlinkages Between Energy
Poverty and Low Carbon Development in China and Germany by Developing an Energy Poverty
Index, 183 ENERGY & BLDGS. 817, 824-25, 828 (2019) (discussing energy affordability challenges
resulting from Germany's overly generous support for solar and other renewables); EuanPhimister et
al., The Dynamics ofEnergy Poverty: Evidencefrom Spain, 4 ECON. ENERGY & ENV'T POL'Y 153,
157 (2015) (noting the growing energy poverty in Spain that accompanied the country's solarboom).
107 See, e.g., Davies & Allen, supra note 79, at 957 (describing "Germany's effort to transform its
energy system away from nuclear and conventional sources").
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solar support program-in some cases even retroactively. 08 At the other end of
the spectrum, taking a conservative approach to public policy support for solar
and other emerging energy technologies can avoid the budgetary concerns associated with overpaying. But such frugality may come at the expense of policy efficacy, as incentive levels prove too low to deliver the desired deployment.1 09 Simply speaking, policy-makers are under enormous pressure to get,
and keep, the price right when it comes to support programs for emerging energy technologies.o Many jurisdictions assign this task to the same regulators
that oversee local utilities and their rate case proceedings. It should not come
as a huge surprise, therefore, that some of these regulators, inspired by decades
of success with automatic fuel adjustment clauses, have turned to regulatory
automation for help.
When Oregon launched its Solar Photovoltaic Volumetric Incentive Program in 2010, incentive rates of up to $0.65 per kilowatt-hour of solargenerated electricity "'1 were soon criticized as too high relative to technology
and installation costs, providing windfall profits to developers." 2 Available
capacity was, indeed, oversubscribed during early enrollment rounds, leading
the Oregon Public Utility Commission (OPUC) to convert capacity allocation

108 For a detailed account of the unraveling of Spain's solar support program, see Toby Couture,
Pain in Spain: New Retroactive ChangesHinderRenewable Energy, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD
(Apr. 19, 2013), https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2013/04/pain-in-spain-new-retroactive-changes-hinders-renewable-energy.htnl [https://perna.cc/A3F4-NRJC].
109 The City of Palo Alto's 2012 solar support scheme illustrates this dilemma, with incentives
too low to promote any solar deployment during the first three years of its existence. See Gary M.
Lucas, Jr. & Felix Mormann, Betting on Climate Policy: UsingPredictionMarkets toAddress Global
Warming, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1429, 1474 (2019). Argentina experienced similar problems when
its 2006 wind support program delivered only minimal deployment. See MENDONI2A ET AL., supra
note 79, at 57.
110 One way out of this dilemma is, of course, for policy-makers to choose market-based mechanisms, instead of their price-based counterparts, to promote emerging energy technologies. For aprimer on the distinction between both and their global proliferation, see INT'L ENERGY AGENCY,
DEPLOYING RENEWABLES 2011: BEST AND FUTURE POLICY PRACTICE 161-71(2011), https://www.
iea.org/reports/deploying-renewables-2011-best-and-future-policy-practice [https://penna.cc/J32MAUZM]; INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, DEPLOYING RENEWABLES: PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE POLICIES
92-95 (2008), https://www.iea.org/reports/deploying-renewables-principles-for-effective-policies
[https://perma.cc/UM8E-K82Z]; see also Felix Monnann, Re-allocatingRisk: The Casefor Closer
IntegrationofPrice- and Quantity-BasedSupportPoliciesforClean Energy, 27 ELEC. J. 9, 10 (2014)
(making the case for joint implementation of price-based and market-based policies).
111
See OR. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC VOLUMETRIC INCENTIVE PROGRAM:
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 3 (2013), https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/citizen_
engagement/Reports/2013_PUCSolaro2OPhotovoltaic%20Volumetric%20Incentive%20Program.
pdf [https://perma.cc/83PJ-7Y35].
112 See, e.g., In re Pub. Util. Comm'n of Or.: Solar Voltaic Comments and Recommendations,
No. UM 1505, at 3 (Feb. 11, 2011) (statement of Dave Sullivan) ("The incentive rates were at least 30
percent too high to balance the available capacity with demand.").
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from a first-come, first-served system to a lottery. " 3 Still, the OPUC had done
its homework and appreciated the considerable challenge of getting-and
keeping-their solar incentives at appropriate levels amidst a fast-changing
industry. From the beginning, the Oregon program included an automatic rate
adjustment mechanism, allowing incentive rates to rise or fall from one enrollment round to the next." 4
Unlike the fuel adjustment clauses that inspired its adoption, Oregon's
rate adjustment mechanism was not tethered to the price of solar panels, inverters, or any other input. Instead, the policy-maker decided to use an outputoriented indicator-observed solar deployment-as the trigger for regulatory
adaptation. When demand exceeds available capacity by a specified margin,
the mechanism reduces the rate for the following round and, conversely, raises
it if an enrollment round is undersubscribed.1 5 These automatic adjustments
were originally limited to increments of ten percent, but eventually modified to
allow for rate adjustments of up to twenty percent."1 6 Other jurisdictions have
adopted similar frameworks of regulatory automation as part oftheir clean energy policies.1 7
The output-oriented version of automated regulation offers two distinct
advantages over fuel adjustment clauses and other input-focused mechanisms.
First, it expressly acknowledges the multitude of factors, many of them subject
to frequent and sometimes dramatic changes, that determine the overall perunit generation cost of solar installations. 1" Solar panels, inverters, and other
hardware, for example, have undergone a series of dramatic price drops over
id. at 4-5.
See OR. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, supra note 111, at 6.
115 See id. at 7-8.
11 6
Id. at 7.
117 See, e.g., CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT: 2013 IEPR 92-93
(2013) (discussing California's Renewable Market Adjusting Tariff), https://www.energy.ca.gov/datareports/reports/integrated-energy-policy-report [https://perma.cc/G9AA-2U35]; Davies & Allen, supra note 79, at 955 (referencing the "breathing cap" in Germany's renewable energy support
schemes). But see Winding Creek SolarLLC v. Peterman, 932 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2019) (invalidating California's Re-MAT program on preemption grounds); Frank Jossi, What Goes into Calculating Minnesota'sGroundbreaking "Value ofSolar"Rate?, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Sept. 9,2019),
https://energynews.us/2019/09/09/midwest/what-goes-into-calculating-minnesotas-groundbreakingvalue-of-solar-rate/ [https://perma.cc/2TF4-RBQB] (exploring the eight key variables, such as avoided
fuel cost or avoided distribution capacity cost, feeding into the complicated formula that automatically
calculates the rate for electricity from community solar projects in Minnesota).
118 The prevailing metric in the literature for suchper-unit generation cost is the "levelized cost of
electricity," representing the cost per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated based on a power plant's
capital costs, fuel costs, fixed and variable costs for operation and maintenance, and financing costs
over the operational life of the plant. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COST AND
LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK
2015, at 1 (2015), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/archive/aeol5/pdf/electricitygeneration 2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CG3 C-XDX6].
113 See
114
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the past decade alone.' 19 Soft costs, such as those incurred for permitting, installation, and financing, are subject to similar fluctuations and account for an
ever-increasing share of overall project cost. 20 It is a testament to the Oregon
regulator's diligence that its solar incentive program also sought to incorporate
site-specific factors such as variations in solar resource quality across different
'

areas of the state.' 2

The second key advantage of Oregon's rate adjustment mechanism lies in
the output-oriented approach's capacity to operate as a steering tool. Fuel adjustment clauses serve a primarily reactive purpose-adjusting utility rates to
reflect past changes in fuel prices. Output-based adjustment mechanisms, such
as Oregon's solar program, also react to changes in the overall cost of solar installations. In addition, however, use of specific deployment benchmarks as triggers for regulatory adaptation, in the form of an automatic rate adjustment upwards or downwards, enables the Oregon policy-maker to guide and, ultimately,
control the overall pace and volume of deployment. 22 This steering function is
all the more important in light of the lingering uncertainty over the impact that
ramping up the share of solar, wind, and other weather-dependent renewables
with variable output will have on the reliability of electric service.1 2 3

119 See, e.g., RAN FU ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB'Y, U.S. SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC
SYSTEM COST BENCHMARK: Q1 2017, at vi (2017), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy l7osti/68925.pdf
[https://penna.cc/2ZTM-U9RG] (reporting approximately 30% cost declines for utility-scale solar
systems from 2016 to 2017).
120 Id. at viii (reporting soft costs as responsible for 68% of overall costs in residential solar projects). For an introduction to soft costs and the factors that drive them, see Felix Mormann, Enhancing
the Investor Appeal ofRenewable Energy, 42 ENV'T L. 681, 710-25 (2012).
121 As a tribute to regional variations in insolation, Oregon's solar incentive program divides the
state into four different regions, each with its own rate. See OR. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, INVESTIGATION
INTO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOLAR PROGRAMS IN OREGON, at iv, 8 (2014), https://olis.leg. state.or.

us/liz/2015Rl/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/49006 [https://perma.cc/FA8Z-SD35].
122 To be clear, increases in electricity rates following application of a fuel adjustment clause
should, following basic economic theory, affect demand, but the general lack of price elasticity, especially among residential ratepayers, limits the size of this effect. More importantly, it comes as an
afterthought whereas output-based rate adjustments, such as that of Oregon's solar scheme, require the
policy-maker to set specific output goals as the starting point of any adaptation.
12 Critics of the large-scale build-out of solar and wind power often claim that the intermittent
output profiles of these renewable resources willjeopardize the stability of the electrical grid. According to one commentator, for example, "[w]hen renewables supply 20 to 30 percent of all electricity,
many utility-energy engineers predict, the system will no longer be able to balance supply and demand." See Charles C. Mann, What if We Never Run Out of Oil?, THE ATLANTIC (May 2013), https://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/05/what-if-we-never-run-out-of-oil/309294/ [https://
perma.cc/X6R6-LGMP]. To be sure, empirical evidence suggests that the grid can likely absorb larger
quantities of intermittent renewables. Gennany, for example, tripled the share of solar and wind power
in its electricity mix between 2006 and 2013 to 26%, all the while managing to reduce average annual
outage times. See Mormann et al., supra note 80, at 71, 86.
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III. TOWARD A NORMATIVE THEORY OF AUTOMATED REGULATION
So far, I have explained the conceptual appeal of automated regulation for
policy-makers as insurance against forecast errors and presented a series of
case studies of regulatory automation to illustrate its practical relevance. But
what does the future hold for automated regulation? Are fuel adjustment clauses and their progeny just a brief stopover along the evolutionary path toward
algorithmic governance? Or should regulatory automation in its current simplistic, yet tried-and-true, form become a more widely used, permanent feature
in the policy-making toolkit?
To answer these questions, this Part surveys and weighs the most prominent arguments for and against automated regulation, probes into its ideal
scope of application, and offers recommendations for the proper relationship
between market-based auto-regulations and the underlying markets. What
emerges from this exercise is the first step toward conceptualizing a normative
theory of regulatory automation.
A caveat is in order: over the past fifty years, automated regulation has
received surprisingly scant scholarly attention. 2 4 Following a brief surge in
scholarly interest and litigation over the propriety of fuel adjustment clauses in
the mid-twentieth century, regulatory automation has managed to largely avoid
the limelight of public discourse. Accordingly, many of the arguments surveyed below were originally crafted in the context of fuel adjustment clauses.
In light of their archetypical role for automated regulation, lessons learned
over a century ofpractical experience with fuel adjustment clauses are likely to
be of value for regulatory automation more generally. Still, subtle differences
in the design and implementation of different types of self-executing regulation
may produce widely divergent outcomes, cautioning against the stereotypical
application of arguments from one regulatory tool to another.125
The arguments raised for and against regulatory automation can be grouped
into four categories. The first engages with the efficiency implications of automated regulation.1 2 6 The second category questions the fit of automated
regulatory tools with the administrative process. 27 The third type of arguments
engages with the political economy of regulatory intervention. 12 The fourth

&

124 See Pidot, supra note 3, at 168 (lamenting that automated regulation has received
"so little
attention").
15 See Trigg, supra note 7, at 974 (cautioning against too much, if any, stereotyping
when it
comes to fuel adjustment clauses due to the amount of variation among such clauses); Bennear
Wiener, supra note 62, at 5 ("Each instrument for adaptive regulation may pose a different mix of
pros and cons.").
126 See discussion infra Part III.A.
117 See discussion infra Part
III.B.

" See discussion infra Part III.C.
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class of arguments critically examines the effect of regulatory automation on
special interests, using a framework grounded in public choice theory.1 29
After establishing the normative value of automated regulation, this Part
probes into its ideal range of operation.1 30 Finally, this Part offers a narrowly
framed justification for when to use market-based auto-regulations instead of
simply placing the regulatory reigns in the market's invisible hand.131
A. The Efficiency Implications ofRegulatory Automation
Proponents of regulatory automation like to point to efficiency gains as a
key virtue of fuel adjustment clauses and similarly automated tools. This argument tends to unfold along two related prongs. The first prong emphasizes
the ability of automated regulation to adjust to changing circumstances without
the need for active regulatory intervention that often unfolds in the form of
lengthy administrative proceedings. Regulatory automation, thus, is said to
save critical time and offset otherwise pervasive regulatory lag. This streamlining feature of the regulatory adjustment process features prominently in the
literature on the paradigmatic example of fuel adjustment clauses. Richard
Pierce, for example, expressed deep concern that any substantial regulatory lag
in adjusting utility rates to fuel cost increases could quickly drive an otherwise
financially healthy utility into bankruptcy.1 32 The very regulators that are, at
least partly, responsible for these delays, have openly acknowledged the administrative state's frequent inability to deliver timely responses to changing
realities. Writing for the Virginia State Corporation Commission more than
half a century ago, Commissioner Catterall quipped:
The inevitable delay between the happening of an event that entitles
a party to legal relief and the date when he gets relief makes it impossible in some kinds of cases for law and equity to do complete
justice. Ever since Hamlet mentioned "the law's delay" as one of the
things that made him wonder whether it was better "to be or not to
be," lawyers and legislators have sought of overcoming so far as
possible the time lag in the machinery of justice. 133

129

See discussion infra Part III.D.

13" See discussion infra Part III.E.
131 See discussion infra Part ITIF.
13 See Pierce, supra note 7, at 373; see also Foy, supra note 7, at 663, 668 (lamenting the complex and time-consuming nature of rate case proceedings).
133
Re Lynchburg Gas Co., 6 P.U.R.3d 33, 35 (Va. State Corp. Comm'n), additionalopinion sub
nom. Re Va. Elec. & Power Co., 7 P.U.R.3d 108 (Va. State Corp. Comm'n 1954), aff'dsub nom. City
of Norfolk v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 90 S.E.2d 140 (Va. 1955).
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Whatever the veracity of Catterall's claim regarding the motivation behind the Prince of Denmark's famous soliloquy, the concern over regulatory
lag underlying the Commissioner's statement still resonates today. Recent
commentary highlights the ability of automated regulation to facilitate timely
adjustments as new information becomes available. 134
The second, closely related prong revolves around the costs imposed by
the regulatory process itself, beyond those incurred due to the resulting delay.
This line of reasoning emphasizes the transaction costs associated with regulatory proceedings, from notice-and-comment rulemaking to adjudication.131
Writing in defense of the fuel adjustment clause, commentators frequently
point to the complexities and expenses associated with otherwise necessary
rate case proceedings as a critical benefit of regulatory automation.1 36
The efficiency argument in favor of regulatory automation, based on time
and cost savings, is not undisputed. Critics draw attention to the higher upfront
costs associated with the crafting of automated regulations. In order to create
sensible self-executing adjustment mechanisms, regulatory automation requires more extensive study of the nature and context of a given problem at the
outset.1 37 This initial due diligence might ask regulators to identify and assess a
variety of more or less foreseeable circumstances and to determine ex ante the
specific policy response to each of them.1 38
There can be little doubt that automated regulations require greater upfront investment, in terms of both time and effort, than traditional methods of
static regulation. Thinking through all possible eventualities and determining
the appropriate regulatory responses ahead oftime places heightened demands
not only on regulators but also on those of their constituents participating in
the process. A key premise of automated regulation and other forms of adaptive governance, however, is their enhanced ability to withstand the test of
time. As Justin Pidot reminds us, "Static legal rules, sensible when enacted,
may become out of date, outliving their usefulness."1 39 Designed to adapt to
changing circumstances, automated regulations are likely to be longer-lived
than their static counterparts who will require periodic manual adjustments to
stay relevant. Overtime, the transaction costs of these adjustments, along with
14 See, e.g., Pidot, supra note 3, at 170 (describing how automated regulation "minimizes delays
in responding to new information").
13 See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
136 See, e.g., Foy, supra note 7, at 663 ("Few types of legal proceedings are more . .
expensive
than the full-blown utility rate case . . . .").
137 See Pidot, supra note 3, at 168; see also Bennear & Wiener, supra note 62, at 28 ("If all of the
automated adaptation rules must be designated in the initial rulemaking, this requires good knowledge
about the key parameters that will trigger future adaptation, at the time of the original rulemaking.").
13 See Pidot, supra note 3, at 170.
139 Id. at 140.
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the resulting delays, are likely to dwarf the relatively higher upfront cost required for crafting automated regulations. So long as these regulations are sufficiently long-lived and not abandoned prematurely for political or other extrinsic motivations, the greater initial investment should pay dividends in terms
of both time and money, improving the overall efficiency of the regulatory
process.
The literature on fuel adjustment clauses has produced another, more targeted, efficiency critique. Some openly tout the virtues of regulatory delay,
worrying that the self-adjusting features of automated regulation eliminate the
"discipline of regulatory lag."140 Critics voice concern that the ability to pass
along cost increases through automatic rate adjustments reduces the incentive
of utilities to prioritize cost minimization and efficiency when choosing among
competing technologies and fuels.141 Relatedly, some worry that a clause's focus on price trends in certain cost inputs, such as fuel, may yield inefficient
outcomes by ignoring countervailing developments, such as reductions in other
cost inputs, which may significantly alter the utility's overall cost structure.1 4 2
The merits of these critiques notwithstanding, they question not so much the
concept of regulatory automation generally, but rather, the specifics of its implementation through fuel adjustment clauses in the utility context. In fact, rather than abandon regulatory automation altogether, the critics themselves are
keen to offer suggestions for more rigorous monitoring and other tweaks to
improve the efficiency of these clauses without sacrificing the broader benefits
of automated regulation. 143
A final efficiency-related critique concerns the impact of regulatory automation on the predictability of self-adjusting governance tools. In the context
of fuel adjustment clauses, for example, skeptics have worried that utility rates'
automatic tracking of fuel prices will confuse consumers who "have a right to
know [their] utility rate with certainty in advance."1 44 Even proponents of
adaptive governance concede that the value of regulatory flexibility must be
considered against the value of policy stability and predictability. 145 Policy
uncertainty has been shown to impose costs, such as when investors ask for
Leaffer, supra note 89, at 233.
See, e.g., Foy, supra note 7, at 664, 670; Isaac, supra note 85, at 168-69.
142
See Foy, supra note 7, at 664; Jones, supra note 97, at 542-43 (calling for greater differentiation among different types of costs); Leaffer, supra note 89, at 234.
143 Leaffer, supra note 89, at 265.
144 Foy, supra note 7, at 664; see also Re Wash. Gas Light Co., 1920D PUR. 626, 628 (D.C.
P.U.C. 1920);Re Pub. Serv. Gas Co., 1920E P.U.R. 395, 397 (N.J. P.U.C. 1920); Jonesv. Montpelier
& Barre Light & Power Co., 1921D P.U.R. 145, 150 (Vt. P.S.C. 1921).
145 See Bennear & Wiener, supra note 62, at 5 (noting Roscoe Pound's tenet that "[l]aw must be
stable, and yet it cannot stand still" (quoting ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY
14'
141

1 (1923))).
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higher returns to mitigate perceived risks of policy changes that would negatively affect their investment. 146 More generally, perceptions of policy instability can undermine public confidence in, and ultimately, compliance with, regulatory mandates. The same, however, can also be said of policies that prove too
sticky and eventually become obsolete for failure to adjust to changing circumstances.1 47 Whether the required trade-offs point to static or adaptive governance will likely depend on the regulatory context. Still, the predictability critique of regulatory automation urges policy-makers to craft adaptive governance tools and their self-executing adjustment mechanisms in the most transparent and accessible way possible. Failure to do so may well take away some,
if not most, of the purported efficiency gains of automated regulations.1 48
B. Misfits in the Administrative State?
Since their earliest adoption, fuel adjustment clauses have been viewed
with suspicion, including by the very agencies to whom their implementation
promised the greatest benefits. In 1921, for example, the Pennsylvania Public
Service Commission considered such automated regulation to be incompatible
"with the spirit and purpose of' regulatory law.1 49 A few years later, the Indiana Public Service Commission voiced more specific concerns, questioning its
authority to make changes to the regulated rates of its utilities contingent on
future events. 5 0 The Maine Public Utilities Commission, meanwhile, criticized
automated fuel adjustment clauses as illegal burden-shifting instruments that
transfer the onus of proving the reasonableness of rates "from the utility where
it legally belongs, to the Commission where it does not belong."' 5 ' Others,
finally, challenged these clauses for violating due process based on the lack of
notice and hearing opportunities before each rate increase. 5 2
Two pivotal state supreme court decisions have addressed these issues
and helped clarify the proper place for automatic fuel adjustment clauses within the administrative state. In City ofNorfolk v. VirginiaElectric & Power Co.,
146 See, e.g., Mormann, supra note 120, at 705-06 (explaining the value of policy certainty
and
stability for investment decisions in the context of clean energy technologies).
147 See Bennear & Wiener, supra note 62, at 5.
148 The importance of regulatory predictability and certainty similarly cautions against
excessive

reliance on machine learning and smart algorithms as replacements for algebra-based adjustment
mechanisms. For an intriguing account of the opacity of the algorithms that govern much of our daily
lives, see generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACKBOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).

Foxv. Pine Grove Elec. Light, Heat & Power Co., 1920B P.U.R. 380, 385 (Pa. P.S.C. 1921).
See Re Ind. Serv. Corp., 1930B P.U.R. 278, 281 (Ind. P.S.C. 1930).
151 Re Portland Gas Light Co., 69 P.U.R. (N.S.) 154, 157 (Me. P.U.C.
1947).
152
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Ill. Com. Comm'n, 150 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. 1958); City of Norfolk v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 90 S.E.2d 140, 148 (Va. 1955).
149
150
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the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed the plaintiff's due process concerns
about an escalator clause for natural gas rates. The court held that "notice is
not required on each occasion there is a change in the ratepayers' bills," but
rather, only in the event of a "change in the filed schedules which are the underlying bases for the computation of those bills."1 53 The court went on to note
that aggrieved ratepayers were free to file a complaint with the commission at
any time and argue that the imposed rates were "unjust and unreasonable."
The Supreme Court of Virginia also dismissed the plaintiff's challenge to
the State Corporation Commission's (SCC) authority to replace its traditional
practice of ratemaking through periodic rate case proceedings with an automated fuel adjustment clause. 5 5 Importantly, the court found no need for express statutory authorization of such clauses, noting that the SCC was free to
substitute a mathematical formula for its previous dollars-and-cents rate determinations:

The proposed escalator clause is nothing more or less than a fixed
rule under which future rates to be charged the public are determined. It is simply an addition of a mathematical formula to the
filed schedules of the Company under which the rates and charges
fluctuate as the wholesale cost of gas to the Company fluctuates.
Hence, the resulting rates under the escalator clause are as firmly
fixed as if they were stated in terms of money.1 56
Three years later, the Supreme Court of Illinois adopted both the due process and regulatory authority holdings of Virginia's high court in City ofNorfolk and resolved the last lingering concerns about burden-shifting and the authority of state regulatory commissions to adopt fuel adjustment clauses. 57 In
City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Commission, the Supreme Court of Illi-

nois dismissed the plaintiff's concerns that the fuel adjustment clause would
shift the burden of proof away from the utility and onto the commission or
consumers. After all, the Illinois Public Utilities Act unequivocally assigns the
burden of proof to the utility "[i]n all proceedings before the [Illinois Com-

153 Va. Elec. & Power Co., 90 S.E.2d at 149. This widely accepted judicial deference to utilityfiled schedules and tariffs, although still inplace today, is not without critics. See Jim Rossi, Lowering
the FiledTariffShield: JudicialEnforcementfora DeregulatoryEra, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1591, 1592
(2003) (warning that "by influencing when courts will hear cases involving regulated firms, the filed
tariff doctrine has an alarmingly sweeping scope and effect").
154 Va. Elec. & Power Co., 90 S.E.2d at 149.
155 See id. at 146.
156 Id. at 148.
151 See Ill. Com. Comm 'n, 150 N.E.2d at 779.
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merce] Commission." 58 If the Commission has doubts as to the rate produced
by the fuel adjustment clause, all it has to do is suspend the resulting rate to
require the utility to carry its burden that the suspended rate was, in fact, just
and reasonable.
The scholarly literature continues to support the judiciary's deferential
approach to utility ratemaking even as restructuring is changing the regulatory
landscape.1 59 This call for deference is based, in part, on the expectation that
judicial review of utility rates by non-expert judges would impose high error
costs as well as unduly burdensome constraints on judicial resources.1 60 Another argument against excessive judicial oversight rests on the view that the
rate-making process includes self-correcting features, as regulators can make
up for a rate set too high or too low in one year by commensurate adjustment
the following year.161 Where automated regulation incorporates proactive elements, such as rates based on forecasts of demand, supply, and other relevant
factors, similar self-correcting features can, and should, be incorporated into
the self-adjusting mechanism to further its function as insurance against forecast errors. 162
Lingering resentment of fuel adjustment clauses in parts of the literature
notwithstanding,1 63 the decisions ofthe Illinois and Virginia high courts firmly
established the legitimacy of fuel adjustment clauses. Although the courts'
holdings are limited to these clauses, the underlying reasoning offers important
guidance for automated regulation more broadly. Due process, for example,
does not appear to require notice and hearing opportunities for every single adjustment made by automated regulation. Rather, these requirements need only be
satisfied at the time of the self-adjusting regulation's original adoption.1 64
Just as importantly, automated regulation appears not to require express
statutory authorization so long as such automation delivers the same type of
15

1 d at 781 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3,¶ 30 (1957)); see also Trigg, supra note 7, at
971-72 (noting that virtually all state public utility statutes, as well as the Federal Power Act and the
National Gas Act, have similar, if not identical, provisions).
159 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the Judiciary
Attempt to Police the PoliticalInstitutions?, 77 GEo. L.J. 2031, 2033 (1989); Susan Rose-Ackerman
& Jim Rossi, DisentanglingDeregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1454 (2000).
160 See Pierce, supra note 159, at 2046.
161 See Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 159, at 1454-55.
162
See discussion supra Part1. To incentivize more diligent and comprehensive information sharing by utilities and other regulated entities for the purpose of reducing information asymmetries, such
self-correcting mechanisms could be designed to reward more accurate (and penalize inaccurate) projections, based on the differential observed between forecast and actual data.
163 See Leaffer, supra note 89, at 237, 265 (describing fuel adjustment clauses as an "aberration in
the regulatory process" that "should not become a permanent feature of the regulatory process").
164 See City of Chicago v. Ill. Com. Comm'n, 150 N.E.2d 776, 779-80 (Ill. 1958); City of Norfolk v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 90 S.E.2d 140, 147-48 (Va. 1955).
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work product that the traditional "manual" regulatory process would have produced. Both courts had no problem with the commission's use of a "mathematical formula" to make its rate determinations, given that the eventual work
product, utility rates, looked "as if they were stated in terms of money." 165
Extrapolating beyond the more thoroughly researched, and litigated, domain of fuel adjustment clauses, these insights suggest a surprisingly broad
range of applications for automated regulation. Based on the reasoning explicit
in the Illinois and Virginia Supreme Court decisions, policy-makers can harness the benefits of regulatory automation in the here and now-without the
need for express statutory authorization of such autopilot regulation-across a
wide range of circumstances. Whenever a statute calls for regulation by numbers such as the setting of a utility's rates, courts should have no trouble signing off on regulation that supplants static numerical values with a system of
pre-determined triggers and mathematical adjustment mechanisms that, ultimately, also yields precise numbers, albeit as the product of a much more dynamic process. Numbers-based regulation is prevalent in a variety of fields. Accordingly, "regulating by math" 66 is already authorized for many key areas of
governance, including health care, benefits administration, tax policy, environmental conservation, and pollution abatement, to name but a few.
As a final procedural point, it is worth noting that automated regulation is,
on average, better suited than traditional methods of static regulation to accommodate administrative law mandates that agencies explain their decisionmaking process.1 67 A well-developed record, including an explanation of underlying rationale and roads not taken, is intended, and frequently required, to
facilitate meaningful judicial review.1 68 For purposes of regulatory automation,
however, it is more than that-a conditlo sine qua non. After all, automated
regulation logically requires ex ante consideration of a wide swath of potential
outcomes, changing circumstances, and regulatory objectives, even in instances where a jurisdiction's administrative laws may impose no such requirement.

165

166

See Ill. Com. Comm 'n, 150 N.E.2d at 779; see also Va. Elec. & Power Co., 90 S.E.2d at 148.
Use of the term "regulating by math" to describe such numbers-based regulation goes back to

a suggestion by Professor Arden Rowell.
167 See Pidot, supra note 3, at 170. The same may, however, not be true of automation
by algorithm. See Ryan Calo & Danielle Keats Citron, The Automated Administrative State: A Crisis of
Legitimacy, 70 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 7, 14-21), https://papers.ssrm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3553590 [https://perma.cc/F8MC-9XW7] (reporting that agencies are
increasingly turning to algorithms and other artificially intelligent systems of automation that they do
not understand, calling into question the very expertise that affords them judicial deference in their
decision-making).
168

See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971), abrogated

by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
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C. The PoliticalEconomy ofAutomated Regulation
Advocates like to point to the political economy benefits of regulatory automation, such as its potential to help overcome political impasse and incentivize stakeholders to share relevant information.1 69 Disagreement over the appropriate policy path forward is often based, at least in part, on diverging beliefs and assumptions of what the future holds. Traditional, static approaches to
regulation tend to require that policy-makers agree on the regulatory regime
that best addresses what appears, at the time, to be the most likely course of
events going forward. Reaching a consensus on how that course of events
should look can pose serious, if not insurmountable, obstacles for the regulatory process. With its ability to adjust to changing circumstances as they unfold,
automated regulation allows policy-makers to incorporate a range of possible
futures into their rulemaking product. The need to consider a wide spectrum of
eventualities ex ante may be considered a bug to the extent that it raises the
upfront costs of regulating. 7 0 But it is also a feature insofar as different
branches of the resulting decision tree can accommodate various, otherwise
competing conceptions of the future."7
Simply speaking, the resulting narrative is one of "ifyour version of the
future comes true, then the regulation shall work this way, but if my version
comes true, then the regulation shall work in another way." In reality, automated regulation is not limited to such binary choices, but rather, can incorporate a
variety of competing viewpoints and assumptions about the future. This inclusivity of self-adjusting regulations fosters greater buy-in among stakeholders.
Static approaches to regulation tend to resolve polarizing issues through coalition-building up to the minimum required level of support-at the expense of
alienating other, not expressly considered, positions. Automated regulation, by
contrast, has the potential to foster greater inclusion, growing the number of
stakeholders who feel that their viewpoints have been considered, thereby enhancing popular support for the regulatory work product. 7 2

169 Justin Pidot's work on the political economy of regulatory automation has been especially
important. See Pidot, supra note 3, at 168-71; see also Bennear & Wiener, supra note 62, at 3 (describing some of the consensus-building features of dynamic models of regulation more generally).
171 See supra notes 137-138 and accompanying text.
171 See Pidot, supra note 3, at 170 (noting that automated regulation "can accommodate competing predictions about the future by creating regulatory rules to govern each possibility").
172 This incorporation of a multitude of potential outcomes differs from the oft-criticized practice
of logrolling among policy-makers insofar as the latter frequently involves trading off and lumping
together disconnected and potentially divergent policy themes and objectives, whereas automated
regulation facilitates the consideration and inclusion of competing views and assumptions about the
future as they relate to the stated regulatory goal. For an introduction to logrolling, see James D.
Bamett, LegislativeLog-Rolling, 8 OR. L. REv. 141, 141-48 (1929); see also James B. Kau & Paul H.
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To illustrate this dynamic, consider the hypothetical example of a state
policy-maker pondering adoption of a new program that would subsidize the
deployment of solar power as part of the state's broader suite of policies to
combat climate change. Policy-makers across the nation, if not the globe, have
considered, and adopted, many such programs in recent years and continue to
do so. The debate that accompanies this process almost invariably features a
mix of some, if not all, ofthe following viewpoints and concerns, often claiming empirical and scholarly support.
ViewpointA: Solar needs more policy support. This view, championed by
the solar industry as well as many environmental groups, assumes that more is
better when it comes to solar policy in order to speed up the transition to a
clean, low-carbon energy economy.1 73
Viewpoint B: Solar needs no (more) policy support. Bullish solar supporters increasingly take the position that solar power does not require public policy support anymore. 7 4 The resulting anti-solar policy stance is, not surprisingly, shared by the fossil fuel industry, many utility incumbents and others who
have historically opposed pro-solar policies as part of a strategy to protect their
vested interests in our fossil-fueled legacy economy.
Viewpoint C: Climate change is not real. Doubters of the reality of climate
change, or its anthropogenic nature, also tend to oppose the shift to a low-carbon
energy economy powered by solar, wind, and other climate-friendly sources of
energy. 7 5
Viewpoint D: Climate change is real, but solarpower is not the remedy.
Even among those genuinely concerned over global climate change, some
question the efficacy and efficiency of solar policy as a mitigation strategy.
Proponents of this view like to point to the example of Germany, a global leadRubin, Self-Interest, Ideology, andLogrollingin CongressionalVoting, 22 J.L. &ECON. 365, 366-67,
380-81 (1979).
173 See, e.g., Varun Sivaram, Opinion, Solar Energy Is at Risk, WASH.
POST (Apr. 16, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/04/16/solar/ [https://penna.cc/76QZEU9D] (arguing that, despite the industry's recent successes, continued policy support for solar is
critical to ensure that the transition to a clean, climate-friendly energy economy proceeds without
delay).
174
See, e.g., Roddy Sheer & Doug Moss, Rooftop Solar Cost Competitive with the Grid in Much
ofthe U.S., SCI. AM. (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/rooftop-solar-costcompetitive-with-the-grid-in-much-of-the-u-s/ [https://penna.cc/PL82-DP6J]; see also Lincoln L.
Davies, EulogizingRenewable Energy Policy, 33 J. LAND USE & ENv'TL. 309, 310 (2018) ("[W]hile
the current form of renewable energy policy may not be (quite) dead (just) yet, it is undeniable that the
status quo will not remain.").
17

1

See, e.g., Lisa Friedman, 'IDon'tKnowThat It'sMan-Made, 'Trump Says ofClimate Change.

It Is., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/climate/trump-climatechange-fact-check.html [https://penna.cc/82QP-4GSN] (analyzing President Donald Trump's revised
stance toward climate change, which reversed his long-espoused claim that global warming is a hoax
but still questioned human responsibility for it).
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er in the deployment of solar and other renewables, whose carbon emissions
have trended up rather than down.17 6
Viewpoint E: Solarpolicies are (too) expensivefor ratepayers. This view,
frequently espoused by ratepayer advocates as well as utility incumbents, assumes that solar power costs ratepayers more than electricity generated from
coal, natural gas, and other conventional fuels.1 77
Viewpoint F: Ramping up solar will jeopardize grid reliability. Unlike
most conventional power technologies, solar generation requires favorable meteorological conditions, i.e., sunshine, to convert photons into electrons. The
resulting output intermittency has led some to question the electric grid's ability to accommodate a growing share of solar, wind, and other intermittent renewables.1 78

Whatever the merits of these six viewpoints, they offer a small yet representative snapshot of the kaleidoscope of competing opinions and concerns
that factor into the solar policy-making process. More importantly, they help
illustrate the political economy advantages of automated regulation compared
to traditional static regulation. After all, it would be nearly impossible to accommodate all of the above in a single, static solar policy regime. Any solar
subsidy program following traditional regulatory design would likely meet
fierce resistance from all but the solar industry and environmental groups advocating for more pro-solar policy as reflected in Viewpoint A. A static program proposal designed to offer a subsidy of, say, $.02 per kilowatt-hour of
solar electricity would be highly unlikely to move forward due to its apparent
disregard of the concerns underlying Viewpoints B through F.
Enter automated regulation. The self-executing adjustment mechanisms
of regulatory automation enable policy-makers to plan for and incorporate a
wider range of competing viewpoints and assumptions about the future into the
176 See, e.g.,James Conca, Why Aren'tRenewables Decreasing
Germany's CarbonEmissions?,
FORBES (Oct. 10,2017), https://www.foibes.com/sites/amesconca/2017/10/10/why-arent-renewablesdecreasing-gennanys-carbon-emissions/#60a2b29768e1 [https://perma.cc/UY7F-JKQN] (explaining
that massive deployment of solar and other renewables has been unable to make up for Germany's
continued reliance on high-carbon lignite-fueled power following the country's commitment to phasing out nuclear power).
177 See, e.g., Tom Johnson, Rate CounselFaultsNew Solar Subsidiesfor Not Reducing Costs to
Utility Customers,NJ SPOTLIGHTNEWS (Oct. 21,2019), https://www.njspotlight.com/2019/10/ratecounsel-faults-new-solar-subsidies-for-not-reducing-costs-to-utility-customers/ [https://perma.cc/85QYPPHT] (reporting discontent overthe alleged rate impact of New Jersey's pro-solar policies); see also
Troy A. Rule, Solar Energy, Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLiMATE & ENERGY L. 115,
129-42 (2014-2015) (exploring the pervasive use of fairness arguments by utilities opposing net metering and other pro-solar policies).
178 See, e.g., Mann, supra note 123 ("When renewables supply 20 to 30 percent of all electricity,
many utility-energy engineers predict, the system will no longer be able to balance supply and demand.").
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final regulatory work product. Viewpoints A and B, for example, can easily be
addressed using the kind of automatic subsidy adjustment mechanism found in
Oregon's solar incentive program.1 79 To do so, the solar subsidy would start
out at a very modest level. If Viewpoint B were correct that solar power in our
hypothetical jurisdiction no longer required significant financial help, then
even minimal support should be sufficient to promote the desired deployment.
If, on the other hand, Viewpoint A proved accurate in its call for more support,
then observed deployment would lag behind desired levels. In either scenario,
the automatic adjustment mechanism would ensure that a subsidy that proves
too high or low at the outset will quickly ramp down or up until actual deployment levels meet the policy-maker's objectives.
Concerns about the reality of climate change, as reflected in Viewpoint C,
are even easier to address. All it would take is a sunset provision that ends the
subsidy program in the event that a reputable source, such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 8 0 were to conclude that climate change is
either not caused by human behavior or not real at all. A similar type of provision could condition the continued availability ofthe solar subsidy upon measurable reductions in the carbon intensity of our hypothetical jurisdiction's energy mix.' 8 ' If the solar subsidy fails to reduce the carbon intensity after a reasonable period, the program would sunset, prompting the policy-maker to reconsider its choice of tools to combat climate change. Such a provision would
address Viewpoint D's doubts regarding the efficacy of solar policy as a mitigation strategy for the greenhouse gas emissions that drive global warming.
Similarly, automated regulation can account for the impact of ratepayerfunded solar subsidies on electricity bills, a concern expressed in Viewpoint E,
by conditioning the subsidy's availability on annual increases in electricity
bills of no more than, say, 5%. 182 Amore nuanced approach could further provide for a ramp-down of the subsidy when costs increase by 3% to 5%.
179

See supra notes 111-117 and accompanying text.

' The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the United Nations' body for assessing the science related to climate change, best known for its periodic reports and forecasts on
global warming and sea level rise. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 0 C, at v-vi (2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/srl5/ [https://perma.cc/5NKBXHKJ]. It is worth noting that the choice of reputable source itself may well be controversial given
accusations of partiality and bias that doubters of climate change like to raise against the IPCC. See,
e.g., Richard Tol, Opinion, UN Climate ChangeExpertRevealsBias in Global WarmingReport, Fox
NEWS (May 20, 2014), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/un-climate-change-expert-reveals-bias-inglobal-warming-report [https://penna.cc/TTQ4-HAUP].
18 Such a provision would, of course, have to control for a variety of other factors that shape the
carbon footprint of any economy.
18 Retail rates of electricity are the product of a variety of factors, including the price of natural
gas, transmission, and ancillary services, among other costs incurred by the load-serving entity. Accordingly, a cost-containing sunset provision would have to control for these and other factors.
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Finally, automated regulation offers a variety of ways to address Viewpoint F's concerns about the adverse effect that a growing share of solar and
other intermittent renewables will have on the stability of the electric grid. The
simplest way of doing so would be to endow the solar program with a sunset
provision that terminates the subsidy in case average outage times-excluding
outages caused by severe weather and other force majeure events1 83 -in our
hypothetical jurisdiction increase by a set threshold percentage. A more gradual approach could provide for an inverse correlation between the solar subsidy
level and the number of interventions required of the grid operator to maintain
the network's delicate balance. Assuming that intermittent solar power does, in
fact, challenge grid stability, such a regime would provide for gradual reductions in subsidy-and thus, deployment levels-before these challenges escalate into actual outages.
To be clear, the work product of our hypothetical exercise in regulatory automation will be significantly more complex than its static counterpart. After all,
the latter might make do with a one-liner denoting the subsidy value and eligible
technologies. Such complexity appears a small price to pay, however, considering the ability of automated regulation to address and incorporate a wide array of
competing viewpoints and concerns, as demonstrated above.
Crucially, regulatory automation is more than just a catalyst for consensus.
It also provides strong incentives for stakeholders to share relevant information. 184 In the traditional static regulatory process, critics often have little motivation to offer more than a general explanation for their opposition to a project.
If the policy-maker is making what appears to be a binary choice to move forward or not, there may be little benefit in divulging more information than strictly necessary to stall the project. Thus, representatives of Viewpoints B, C, D, E,
and F might do little more than voice their general opposition to a solar subsidy,
leaving the policy-maker in the dark as to the diverse concerns motivating that
opposition. With its ability to add greater nuance to regulatory method and outcome, automated regulation rewards stakeholders willing to elaborate on their
concerns. Once they realize that a policy-maker has far more than just two diametrically opposed options-to proceed or not-to choose from, stakeholders
appreciate that offering up additional information increases the chances that their
input will actually make a difference in the policy-making process and result.
Only by drawing the policy-maker's attention to the alleged correlation between
solar deployment and grid stability can representatives of Viewpoint F hope to
18 Most jurisdictions measure their electrical grid's stability using the System Average Interruption Duration Index that denotes the average service interruption time to consumers in the low- and
medium-voltage grid as a result of causes other than extreme weather and other major events. See
Mormann et al., supra note 80, at 71.
114 See Pidot, supra note 3, at 169-70.
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see their underlying concerns addressed. The same is true, of course, for the various doubts and concerns espoused by Viewpoints B through E.
Thus far, I have explored the political economy benefits of regulatory automation primarily from the ex ante perspective of a polity pondering adoption
of a new program. Many of these benefits may persist well past the adoption
stage to help enhance the legitimacy and, with it, longevity of automated regulation. From an ex post perspective, some of the most ambitious and daring
regulatory endeavors of our time have begun to lose their popular allure and
political support soon after implementation. Consider the health care reforms
brought about by the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, better
known by its popular nickname Obamacare. 8 5 When implementation of the
Act began to reveal the full scope of its dramatic changes to the U.S. health
care system, approval rates among Americans declined from fifty percent in
mid-2010 to an all-time low of thirty-three percent by November 2013.186
When asked to put their money where their mouth, or rather their ballot, was,
many voters apparently felt buyer's remorse, making the Affordable Care Act
an easy target during the 2016 presidential campaign.18 7
This kind of popular backlash is not uncommon, especially in the context
of policies that push the electorate's pressure points, such as by raising the cost
of living or encroaching upon personal freedoms. The Affordable Care Act
may have survived, for now.' 88 But other policies have been less lucky. When
the going gets tough and lofty policy goals translate to real-world costs for the
1 5

1 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). For a snapshot of the vast literature on the Affordable Care Act, see generally, for example, Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, andResponsibility
After the PatientProtectionandAffordable CareAct, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577 (2011) (exploring the
Affordable Care Act as a new social contract that distributes risk and places an emphasis on personal
responsibility in health care decisions); Erwin Chemerinsky, PoliticalIdeology and Constitutional
Decisionmaking: The Coming Example of the Affordable Care Act, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1
(2012) (arguing that the Affordable Care Act is clearly constitutional but that political ideology, rather
than constitutional doctrine, will motivate any decision by the U.S. Supreme Court to uphold the law);

Martha Minow, Affordable Convergence: "ReasonableInterpretation"andthe Affordable CareAct,

126 HARv. L. REv. 117 (2012) (providing an overview of the debate over the Affordable Care Act
and asserting that Chief Justice John Roberts's decision to uphold the law highlights the Court's continued commitment to legal, rather than ideological, decision-making).
186 See KFF Health Tracking Poll: The Public's Views on the ACA, KAISER FAM. FoUND.,

https://www.kff.org/interactive/kff-health-tracking-poll-the-publics-views-on-the-aca/#?response=
Favorable Unfavorable&aRange=all [https://perma.cc/HYW6-8AWK] (Dec. 18, 2020).
117 Ironically, approval rates for the Affordable Care Act have been on the rise since, reaching a
high of 54% in early 2018 and remaining mostly above the 50% mark after that. See id.
"'But see Texas v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 3d 665, 680-83, 689-90 (N.D. Tex. 2018), aff'd
inpart, rev 'dinpart,945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, Californiav. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262
(2020) (reviewing the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate as amended
by the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act).
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electorate, regulatory backtracking turns into temptation.1 89 Here, too, automated regulation's need for greater anticipation of possible outcomes and consideration of potential alternatives may prove to be a feature rather than a bug.
After all, constituents and politicians alike have a much harder time claiming
that the growing pains associated with new policy were unexpected, or even
unintended, when the latter were expressly incorporated into the regulation's
self-executing adjustment mechanisms. The same logic would raise the political costs of undoing a policy for reasons clearly contemplated by its adopting
polity. To be clear, no policy-maker can fully bind its successor. But the consensus-building and transparency-fostering properties of regulatory automation
can, at a minimum, raise the political price of dismantling policies that were
adopted with widespread popular support.
D. Public Choice, SpecialInterests, and the Risk of Gaming
In 1951, Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow's seminal work Social Choice
and Individual Values1 90 laid the foundation for a new field of social science
that would go on to become a dominant theme in contemporary legal scholarship.191 Drawing primarily from the field of microeconomics, public choice
theory treats regulatory decision-making as an analogue to market decisionmaking.1 92 This analogy posits that legislative, regulatory, and electoral institutions form an economy wherein various actors, such as individual citizens, interest groups, and policy-makers, exchange regulatory goods based on the
same market principles that determine the demand and supply of ordinary economic goods.1 93 Today, public choice theory informs scholarly analysis ofjudicial and administrative decision-making across a wide range of substantive
contexts. 194 A central tenet of the public choice narrative is that organized
189 Consider, for example, the ignominious end of Australia's 2011 carbon pricing scheme after
only a few short years. See Lenore Taylor,AustraliaKills Off Carbon Tax, THE GUARDIAN (July 16,
2014), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/17/australia-kills-off-carbon-tax [https://
perma.cc/SWR4-QM3T].
190
191

See generallyKENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951).
See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice in Practiceand Theory, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1657,

1657 (1993) ("While its origins lie in microeconomics, public choice has clearly become one of the
dominant themes in contemporary legal scholarship.").
192 See Steven P. Croley, Theories ofRegulation: Incorporatingthe Administrative Process, 98

COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34-56 (1998) (offering an overview and critique of public choice theory).
&

193 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Theories ofEconomic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SC. 335, 335-40 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON.
MGMT. SC. 3, 3-6 (1971).
194 See, e.g.,William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics WithoutRomance:Implications ofPublic Choice
Theoryfor Statutory Interpretation,74 VA. L. REV. 275, 276-79 (1988); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public
Choice Theory andOvercriminalization,36 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 715, 722-23 (2013); Daniel H.
Lowenstein, CampaignSpending andBallotPropositions:RecentExperience, Public Choice Theory
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groups enjoy greater influence in the regulatory marketplace than individual
voters, as the group's greater aggregate benefits from a given regulatory good
enable it to outbid individual competitors.1 95
Recent scholarship suggests that automated regulation may have a countervailing effect on the dominance of well-organized special interest groups in
the regulatory marketplace.1 96 Where static regulation produces certain and
easy-to-determine benefits and burdens, the argument goes, the flexibility of
self-adjusting regulatory regimes makes it significantly harder to predict the
ultimate outcome, and hence, assess the regime's relative value for specific

interest groups. 197
Perennial optimists might go one step further yet and compare the antilobbying effect of regulatory automation to that of John Rawls's famous "veil
of ignorance." In his foundational work, A Theory ofJustice, Rawls postulates
the need to eliminate special interests that put stakeholders at odds with one
another and tempt them to pursue their own advantage.1 98 To do so, he envisions placing parties behind a veil of ignorance that prevents them from knowing how various options will affect their own interests, forcing them to make
decisions exclusively on the basis of general, impartial considerations. In his
thought experiment, Rawls's veil deprives parties of all knowledge related to
their place in society, class, or social status, their distribution of assets and
abilities, their intelligence, and other critical properties. 199 Regulatory automation, of course, cannot change our awareness of our place in society. With its
built-in flexibility and wide range of potential adjustments, however, automated regulation leaves constituents guessing as to the ultimate effect of said regulation on their own interests. This clouded outlook and the resulting uncertainty should, at a minimum, reduce the expectation value of any lobbying or other
intervention contemplated by special interest groups. If a special interest

&

and the FirstAmendment, 29 UCLA L. REv. 505, 511-13 (1982); JonathanR.Macey, Public Choice:
The Theory ofthe Firm and the Theory ofMarket Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 43, 43-45 (1988);
Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice TheoryJustify JudicialActivismAfter All?, 21 HARv. J.L.
PUB. POL'Y 219,219-20 (1997); Matthew L. Spitzer, MulticriteriaChoice Processes:An Application of
Public ChoiceTheory to Bakke, the FCC, andthe Courts, 88 YALEL.J. 717,717-18 (1979). For a comprehensive account of the widespread adoption of public choice theory by legal scholarship, see generally
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION

(1991) (providing a survey of public choice theory as it relates to understanding the legislative process
and its influence on legal doctrine and studies).
195 See, e.g., Croley, supra note 192, at 39 ("[T]he regulatory market works, on the whole, to the
advantage of organized groups with narrow interests.").
196 See Pidot, supra note 3, at 171.
197 See id. ("[Ilt may be unpredictable when initial rules are established which parties will
be most
affected by future restrictions . . . .").
198 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118 (1999).
199

Id.
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group's desired outcome is but one of many possible outcomes that selfadjusting regulation could produce, the resulting uncertainty may lower incentives for lobbying.
The intuitive appeal of such an anti-lobbying effect of regulatory automation
notwithstanding, several factors caution against too much optimism. First, even
automated regulation is subject to some degree of default setting in form of the
regulatory outcome that will come to pass if none of the self-executing adjustment mechanisms are triggered. Interest groups may, therefore, have a strong incentive to ensure that this default option advances their special interests. Once the
default option suits their needs, the same groups may use their clout to reduce the
likelihood of deviation from said default, such as by conditioning any autoadjustments on increasingly improbable trigger events. 200 In the extreme, such
interventions could make automated regulation prone to the same status quo bias
frequently found and criticized in traditional, static types of regulation. 2 0
A second concern relates to the costs that interest groups incur when advocating for a specific self-serving outcome. The uncertainties associated with
self-adjusting regulation may reduce the likelihood of a specific outcome, and
therefore, diminish the expectation value of related lobbying or other interventions. But they also reduce the saliency and, with it, the political capital required to advocate for what an objective observer might describe as but one
potential outcome among many.2 02 Regulatory automation's reliance on input
from a wide range of stakeholders 2 03 may further blur the line between participation in the regulatory process and lobbying. In the end, these and other traits
of regulatory automation may reduce the advocacy costs of interest groups to a
point where they are low enough to promise a positive return on investment
even when measured against less-than-certain regulatory benefits.
Finally, caution is warranted insofar as automated regulation may provide
opportunities for interest groups to influence the regulatory outcome well beyond the rulemaking and adoption stages, such as through actions that help
trigger pre-determined automatic adjustments in their favor. To minimize the
risk of such gaming, care must be taken to condition adjustments upon exogeneous factors and events that lie beyond the control of individual interest groups
and even, where possible, the concerted actions of multiple groups. Such gam-

200 See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem

Management andRegulatory Penalty

Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 965-66 (2003) (noting the important role played by default rules in creating incentives for bargaining and cooperation).
20 For a thoughtful inquiry into the potential negative-and positive-effects of status quo bias,
see Kysar, supra note 68, at 815-18.
202 For a discussion of the relative saliency and political cost of special interests, comparing tax
expenditures to direct subsidies, see Mormann, supra note 48, at 337.
203 See discussion supra Part III.C.
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ing-resistant regulatory design will be relatively easy to the extent that timebased triggers are being used.2 04 Market-based triggers present greater risk,
albeit less so when they are anchored in competitive markets where no one
firm or group of firms is in a position to exercise market power. 2 05 Still, policymakers would do well to apply care and keep an eye on pending antitrust proceedings in choosing the triggers for automatic adjustments, especially when
operating in areas of the economy such as energy, where the transition to competitive markets is a work in progress. 2 06
E. Beyond Known Unknowns and Foreseeable Uncertainty
[A]s we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know.
We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are
some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns-the
ones we don 't know we don 't know. 207
-Donald H. Rumsfeld
When asked about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, then-Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously distinguished between "known unknowns" and "unknown unknowns," based on the awareness we have of our
own ignorance. In his thoughtful musings over varieties of uncertainty, Justin
Pidot draws a similar distinction between foreseeable and unforeseeable uncertainty.201 To Pidot, only "known unknowns," that is to say, instances of foreseeable uncertainty-defined as an identifiable range of potential future circumstances-lend themselves to regulatory automation. Unforeseeable uncertainty, he posits, cannot be addressed through the self-executing adjustment
mechanisms of automated regulation, but rather, requires human-led regulatory
intervention as novel, unexpected circumstances materialize. 209
Although Pidot deserves praise for his thoughtful contribution to expanding our typology of uncertainty, his conclusion as to the limitations of automated regulation is less convincing. Pidot presumes that automated regulation
requires ex ante knowledge and consideration of specific uncertainties in order
to accommodate them through self-executing adjustment mechanisms. That is
204
205

See discussion supra Part H.A.
See discussion supra Part I.B.

206 See, e.g., FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 769 (2016) ("[T]he wholesale
electricity market lacks the self-correcting mechanism of other markets.").
207 See News Transcript, U.S. Dep't of Def., DoD News Briefing-Secretary Rumsfeld
and Gen.
Myers (Feb. 12, 2002) (statement of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld), https://archive.defense.
gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636 [https://penna.cc/V75X-6AUR].
208
209

See Pidot, supra note 3, at 177-80.
Id. at 180.
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not so, at least to the extent that unforeseeable uncertainties-the Rumsfeldian
"unknown unknowns"-are captured among the metrics used to trigger automatic adjustments.
To illustrate this dynamic, consider the earlier example of a solar subsidy. 1 0 Following the real-world examples of California and Oregon,21 our hypothetical jurisdiction pegged the value of its subsidy to the pace of solar deployment. If the build-out of solar generation infrastructure proceeds at the
desired pace, then the subsidy value remains stable. If progress is slower (or
faster) than intended, the subsidy automatically ramps up (or down) according
to pre-determined triggers. When policy-makers incorporate these kinds of
self-executing adjustment mechanisms, they are primarily concerned that,
without them, their programs may not keep up with the breathtaking pace of
technology learning that continues to drive down the cost of solar and other
emerging clean energy technologies.2 1 2 The intuitive reaction, then, might be to
peg the subsidy value to the cost of solar panels, inverters, and other critical
hardware. To do so, however, would ignore the reality that, at this point, hardware expenditures account for less than one-third of a system's overall cost. 2 13
Tethering auto-adjustments to actual deployment as opposed to hardware components enables automated regulation to capture a much broader range of developments that may affect a policy's success. By choosing a metric that tracks
the policy's ultimate objective, this outcome-oriented trigger design casts a
wide enough net to capture not only "known unknowns," such as the precise
pace of hardware cost improvements, but also "unknown unknowns" or types
of uncertainty that were unforeseeable at the time of adoption.
In mid-2016, continued declines in the production costs for solar hardware were foreseeable, even if the precise rate was uncertain. But few could
have foreseen the thirty percent tariff on imported solar cells and modules that
President Donald Trump would approve under Section 201 of the Trade Act of
19744 just a year and a half later.
In the summer of 2015, Mr. Trump

21

" See discussion supra Part III.C.
See supra notes 111-117 and accompanying text.

21

See, e.g., KRISTEN ARDANI ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB'Y, COST-REDUCTION
ROADMAP FOR RESIDENTIAL SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAICS (PV), 2017-2030, at vi (2018), https://www.

nrel.gov/docs/fyI 8osti/70748.pdf [https://penna.cc/S43D-EZRV] ("The installed cost of solar photovoltaics (PV) has fallen rapidly in recent years and is expected to continue declining in the future.");
see also supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing the fallout from Spain and Germany's
failure to adjust their solar subsidies to technology learning and rapid cost improvements).
213 See FU ET AL., supra note 119, at vi, viii (reporting that soft costs account for 68% of overall
costs in residential solar projects).
214 See 19 U.S.C. § 2251.
215 See Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, President Trump Approves Relief
for U.S. Washing Machine and Solar Cell Manufacturers (Jan. 22, 2018), https://ustr.gov/about-
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trailed Hillary Clinton by nearly twenty percentage points in the polls. 2 16
Moreover, the "solar trade war[s]" 217 seemed all but resolved following the
World Trade Organization's ruling against U.S. countervailing tariffs imposed
on Chinese solar hardware. 218 And, yet, against all odds, Donald Trump not
only won the presidency, but also wasted little time in ending whatever trade
d tente there might have been between the United States and China. His tariff
proved highly disruptive, causing the solar industry to miss deployment projections for the first time in years and costing more than 3,000 Americans their
jobs.2 19 In other words, it would almost certainly have affected the solar buildout in our hypothetical jurisdiction.
These developments were hard, if not impossible, to foresee for even the
most clairvoyant policy-maker back in 2016. Nevertheless, our hypothetical
solar program would have no difficulty coming up with the appropriate, automated response. That is because the Trump administration's tariffs would register as a slowdown in deployment and thus be captured by the pre-determined
triggers for adaptation. Agnostic as to the precise cause for lagging deployment, the automated solar regulation would simply ratchet up the subsidy level
in order to bring the program back on track. The same self-executing adjustment could address industry-wide strikes, geopolitical tensions reducing the
supply of required rare earth elements and other essential materials, or a global
financial crisis raising the cost of capital for developers.
The lesson here is fairly straightforward. Contrary to scholarly skepticism, regulatory automation can provide effective, and more importantly, time-

us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/january/president-trump-approves-relief-us [https://
penna.cc/GR4Z-RGZ8].
216 General Election: Trump vs. Clinton RCP ElectoralMap, REALCLEARPOLITICS, https://
www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/us/general_elecion trump vsclinton-5491.html
[https://perma.cc/3MLR-HGX5] (click "July 1, 2015" on the line graphto view the underlying polling

average data).
2" See Emily Holden, US. Setting Stagefor Solar Trade War with China, POLITICO (Dec. 15,
2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/15/trump-solar-power-china-trade-barriers-230854
[https://penna.cc/7UT5-5LXG].
2" See Panel Report, United States-CountervailingDuty Me asures on CertainProductsfrom
China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/R (July 14, 2014), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.
aspx?filename-q:/WT/DS/437R.pdf&Open=True [https://penna.cc/YW7K-S8VZ].
219 See Tony Clifford, Section 201, the Sequel: What Will Come ofthe Solar Tariffs?, PV M AG.
(Aug. 28,2019), https://pv-magazine-usa.com/2019/08/28/section-201 -the-sequel-what-will-come-of-

the-solar-tariffs/ [https://penna.cc/7FQ4-FWG8] (criticizing the tariffs for underdelivering on the
promise of a renaissance in domestic solar manufacturing). For an even more dramatic, albeit potentially biased account, see SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS'N, The Adverse Impact ofSection 201 Tariffs:
Lost Jobs, Lost Deployment and Lost Investments (Dec. 2019), https://www.seia.org/researchresources/adverse-impact-section-201 -tariffs [https://penna.cc/T8QA-J4NH] (quantifyingthe Section
201 Tariffs' negative impact on the economy at 62,000 fewer U.S. jobs, 10.5 gigawatts of lost solar
deployment, and $19 billion in lost investment from 2017 through 2021).
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ly answers to even the most improbable and unforeseeable events. The secret
lies in choosing the right metric to trigger self-executing adjustments. Simply
speaking, the better a metric tracks the desired outcome, the more likely it is to
capture all relevant inputs into the value chain, including Donald Rumsfeld's
famous "unknown unknowns." As our hypothetical solar program demonstrates, using observed deployment levels-the ultimate indicator of policy
efficacy-as the relevant trigger metric, casts a wide enough net for automated
regulation to address both foreseeable and unforeseeable uncertainty.
Caution is warranted, however. The fact that pre-determined autoadjustment triggers can provide an effective response even to unforeseeable
developments does not mean that the resulting adjustment necessarily represents the optimal policy response. In our solar subsidy hypothetical, the preprogrammed response to lagging deployment is to throw money at the problem. That may be an effective and possibly efficient remedy for the cost increases caused by Trumpian tariffs but could well prove an inefficient answer
to lag produced by unduly burdensome permitting procedures or other softcost factors.2 20 Policy-makers would do well, therefore, not to let the selfexecuting adjustments of their automated regulations operate completely unmonitored. Even where those adjustments manage to move a policy back on
track toward achieving its stated objective, the chosen path may raise other
concerns, such as those related to efficiency or equity.
F. Why Not Just Leave It to the Market?
This Article distinguishes between time-based and market-based triggers
for self-executing adjustments to automated regulation. I have presented market-based metrics as the more granular, more sophisticated approach.2 2 1 It is
probably no coincidence that the paradigmatic example of fuel adjustment
clauses relies on the market price of a utility's fuel inputs to trigger automatic
escalations (or reductions) of its rates. All of this invites a simple question:
why try to craft complex automated regulation to track market developments
when policy-makers could simply rely on the market itself?
In his seminal work on the efficient market hypothesis, Nobel Laureate
Eugene Fama tested, and ultimately found strong empirical support for, the old
adage that prices in efficient markets reflect available information.
More

22

For a detailed discussion of these and other soft-cost factors along with potential policy remedies, see Mormann, supra note 120, at 704-24.
221 See discussion supra Part I.B.
222 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Efficient CapitalMarkets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 384, 416 (1970) [hereinafter Fama, Efficient CapitalMarkets]];see also Eugene
F. Fama, Efficient CapitalMarkets:11, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1576 (1991) (remarking that "past researchon
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recent scholarship in behavioral economics has added the caveat that market
prices reflect not only available information, but also the trading practices of
market participants who do not always act rationally. 223 Still, few would question the ability of well-organized, competitive markets to serve as conduits and
repositories for relevant information. Policy-makers pondering regulatory automation as a strategy for keeping their policies current in a fast-changing economic environment would, therefore, do well to also consider a directly market-based approach. As they do so, however, they should start by asking
themselves whether the market in question can actually serve all of their policy
interests and objectives.
From a functional perspective, the efficient market hypothesis assumes
the existence of competitive markets free from the exercise of market power,
information asymmetries, and other market failures. In the real world, none
of these characteristics can be taken for granted. This is especially true for
those areas of the economy, such as telecommunications, energy, or air travel,
that have only recently restructured and begun the long and difficult transition
from regulation of service and price to competitive markets.226 Pervasive anticompetitive conduct in the emerging platform market economy further cautions against placing too much faith in the universal ability of markets to deliver on the efficient market hypothesis's promise of prices as the product of information aggregation.
Even where fully competitive markets exist free from market failures,
they may not meet all the objectives a policy-maker seeks to achieve. By design, markets seek to facilitate the most efficient allocation of resources, plac-

market efficiency is among the most successful in empirical economics, with good prospects to remain so in the future").
223 See generally, e.g., Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey ofBehavioralFinance, in
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1053 (George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2003).
224 The Acid Rain Trading Program's cap-and-trade scheme to reduce sulfur dioxide
and nitrogen
oxide emissions offers an illustrative example of such a market-based approach. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7651.
225 See Fama,Efficient CapitalMarkets I, supra note 222, at 387 (discussing the various market
conditions required for market prices to accurately reflect relevant information).
226 See, e.g., Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, ElectricityRestructuring:Deregulationor
Reregulation,23 REGUL. 46, 49 (2000) (noting, for example, the greater "ability of firms with modest
market shares to exercise market power" in the electric industry).
227

See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, The SeparationofPlatforms andCommerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV.

973, 1008-15 (2019) (offering a powerful critique of the conflicts of interest inherent in online platform providers and the businesses that depend on them, including strong incentives for anticompetitive conduct); Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View ofInformationFiduciaries,
133 HARv. L. REv. 497, 502-20 (2019) (expressing a concern that fiduciary duties imposed on online
platform providers will not be sufficient to remedy broader structural market concerns).
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ing goods and services in the hands of those who value them the most.2 28 This
efficiency-optimizing function may align with the stated objective of budget
appropriations and other hard-and-fast economic policies. But it is unlikely to
address the multitude of competing interests-from political earmarking to
distributional equity-that factor into the deal-making required to reach political
consensus in an increasingly partisan environment. 22 9 Place-based tax incentive
programs, for example, are intended to promote economic development. Yet,
they are not designed to deliver the greatest bang for the taxpayers' buck, such
as by targeting those areas that promise the highest productivity.230 Instead,
these tax incentives are commonly aimed at particularly poor parts of the country to help elevate the local citizenry out of poverty. The underlying prioritization of equity and distributional fairness over efficiency runs counter to the
very foundation of market economics. Policy-makers would, therefore, be badly misguided if they thought their equity objectives could be served by turning
the allocation of place-based tax incentives over to the market's invisible hand.
Climate change provides another illustration ofboth the potential and limitations of markets to address pressing policy needs. Traditional regulatory regimes and more market-based policies have long vied for dominance in the
emerging low-carbon economy. 23 1 Economic theory suggests that putting a

price on greenhouse gas emissions is the most efficient policy to reduce humanity's carbon footprint, leaving the market to figure out the best mix of
abatement strategies and technologies. 232 Recent scholarship, however, raises
228 See, e.g., Fama,Efficient CapitalMarkets I, supra note 222, at 383 ("The primary role of the
capital market is allocation of ownership of the economy's capital stock." (emphasis omitted)).
229 See, e.g., SARAH A. BINDER, MINORITY RIGHTS, MAJORITY RULE: PARTISANSHIP AND THE

DEVELOPMENT OF CONGRESS 4-6,9 (1997); DOUGLAS DION, TURNING THE LEGISLATIVE THUMBSCREW: MINORITY RIGHTS AND PROCEDURAL CHANGE IN LEGISLATIVE POLITICS 15 (1997) (noting

the influence of partisanship as a driver of procedural change).
20 For a thoughtful account and critique of place-based tax incentive programs, see Michelle D.
Layser, The Pro-GentrificationOriginsofPlace-BasedInvestmentTax Incentives anda Path Toward
Community OrientedReform, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 745, 771-98.
23 See Mormann, supra note 110, at 9.
23 2
See generally NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERNREVIEW
394 (2007) ("In the absence of any other market failures, introducing a fully credible carbon price
path for applying over the whole time horizon relevant for investment would theoretically be enough
to encourage suitable technologies to develop."); Dominique Finon, Pros and Cons ofAlternative
Policies Aimed at PromotingRenewables, 12 EIB PAPERS 110, 112 (2007), https://www.eib.org/
attachments/efs/eibpapers/eibpapers 2007_v12_n02_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A54-PK4R] ("[I]t is

nonetheless pertinent to ask whether there is a need to promote renewables in situations where economic policies internalise the environmental externalities of polluting energy technologies."); Carolyn
Fischer & Richard G. Newell, Environmentaland Technology PoliciesforClimate Mitigation, 55 J.
ENV'T ECON. & MGMT. 142, 143 (2008) ("[P]olicies that create incentives for fossil-fueled generators
to reduce emissions intensity . .. performbetter than those that rely on incentives for renewable energy producers alone."); Adam B. Jaffe etal.,A Tale ofTwo MarketFailures:Technology andEnvironmentalPolicy, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164, 165 (2005) ("[T]here is little dispute among economists
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important questions as to the propriety of relying primarily on markets to mitigate global climate change and drive the transition to a low-carbon energy future.233 This market skepticism is based on the empirically supported argument
that regulatory approaches are better suited to facilitate long-term planning and
engage the public in the deliberative process required to balance the many
competing values and interests involved.234 Once again, efficiency optimization alone may not produce the desired policy outcome.
It is worth noting, finally, that parts of our society have yet to accept markets as appropriate instruments for determining the valuation and allocation of
resources. When it comes to the allocation of water rights, for example, the
United States is deeply divided as to the proper role for markets. The same debate can be traced in the legal literature.235 Proponents argue that markets are
bound to outperform regulatory regimes. 2 3 6 Opponents take the position that a
resource as precious and essential as water should never be subjected to the
rule of markets. 2 3 7 Similar skepticism toward commoditization and market
governance is evident in other critical areas of the economy, such as electrici23 9
ty238 and healthcare.
that flexible, incentive-oriented policy approaches are more likely to foster low-cost compliance paths
than prescriptive regulatory approaches."); David Klenert et al., Making CarbonPricing Workfor
Citizens, 8 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 669, 669 (2018) ("Economic analyses have long recommended carbon pricing as an indispensable strategy for efficiently reducing GHG emissions and tackling
climate change.").

Market Mechanisms, 72 U.

233 See Alice Kaswan, Energy, Governance, and

MIA. L. REV. 476,

476-77 (2018).
234 See id. at 527-54.
235 For a thoughtful account of the opposing viewpoints, see Vanessa Casado Perez,
Liquid
Business, 47 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 201, 202-09 (2019).
236

See, e.g., RODNEY T. SMITH, TRADING WATER: ANECONOMIC AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
WATER MARKETING 12 (1988); James L. Huffman, Markets, Regulation, andEnvironmentalProtec-

tion, 55 MONT. L. REV. 425, 427 (1994); James L. Huffman, Water Marketing in Western PriorAppropriationStates: A Modelfor the East, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 429, 432 (2004); Andrew P. Morriss,
Real People, RealResources, andReal Choices: The Case for Market Valuation of Water, 38 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 973, 983 (2006); Mateen Thobani, Tradable PropertyRightsto Water: How to Improve
Water Use andResolve Water Conflicts, VIEWPOINT (The World Bank, Private Sector Dev. Dep't,
Washington, D.C.), Feb.1995, at 1.
237 See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, The FallaciesofFreeMarket Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 371, 375 (1992); JosephW. Dellapenna, The Importance ofGetting Names Right: The
Myth of Marketsfor Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENV'T L. & POL'Y REV. 317, 320-21 (2000); Norman
W. Spaulding III, CommodificationandIts Discontents: Environmentalismand the Promise ofMarket
Incentives, 16 STAN. ENV'TL.J. 293, 308-17 (1997).
2
. See, e.g., Peter Cramton, ElectricityMarketDesign, 33 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 589, 590
(2017) (noting that electricity markets are the product of a regulatory process because electricity is
still viewed as an essential service).
239 For a thoughtful discussion of the tension between perceptions of "[h]ealthcare as a [r]ight"
and free-market capitalism in healthcare, see, for example, N. GREGORYMANKIW, THE ECONOMICS
OF HEALTHCARE 6 (2017), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/mankiw/files/economicsof_healthcare.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2QN9-5NYX].
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This Section is not intended to suggest a wholesale dismissal of policymakers' reliance on markets in lieu of automated regulation with market-based
triggers. Rather, it seeks to highlight some of the challenges and complexities
that should factor into the decision-making process. Fully functional and competitive markets may prove superior to even the most sophisticated autoregulation when the goal is to achieve efficiency-based policy objectives. The
more multi-faceted a policy's purpose is, however, the more likely regulatory
automation is to produce more balanced results than markets alone. In these
instances, selective use of market metrics to trigger regulatory adjustment
without handing the reigns over to the market's invisible hand may be the better policy choice.
IV.

AUTOMATED REGULATION AND ALGORITHMIC GOVERNANCE

From credit scoring to advertising campaigns, from human resources to
medical diagnostics, artificial intelligence and smart algorithms have become
an integral part of our daily lives and the global economy. 240 The public sector,
too, is increasingly relying on algorithms to assist with critical functions, such
as crime prevention or tax audit selection. 2 4 1Not surprisingly, the proliferation
of algorithms has spawned a burgeoning legal literature, raising important concerns about the compatibility of algorithmic decision-making and governance
with due process and other constitutional and societal values.242 Surprisingly, the
24 See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, BigDataandArtificialIntelligence: New Challengesfor Workplace
Equality, 57 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 313, 313-14 (2019) (explaining algorithms in the workplace);
Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 633, 636 (2017) (discussing
algorithmic decision-making in credit card applications); W. Nicholson Price II, RegulatingBlack-Box
Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 423 (2017) (exploring the use of algorithms in the medical field);
Rory Van Loo, Rise ofthe DigitalRegulator,66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1281-82 (2017) (reviewing the use
of algorithms to facilitate comparison among the offerings on travel websites and other platforms);
Mike Kaput, Al andAdvertising: Everything You Need to Know, MKTG. A.I. INST. (Jan. 8, 2020),
https://www.marketingaiinstitute.com/blog/ai-in-advertising [https://penna.cc/LH6B-YGWV] (Dec.
22, 2020).
241 See, e.g., DAVID ROBINSON ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS, BIG DATA, AND OUR ALGORITHMIC FUTURE: A SEPTEMBER 2014 REPORT ON SOCIAL JUSTICE AND TECHNOLOGY 18-19 (2014), https://
paulohm.com/classes/infoprivl 5/files/upturn-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZ62-CC92]; ElizabethE.
Job, Policingby Numbers: Big Dataandthe FourthAmendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 3 5,42-55 (2014)
(analyzing algorithmic crime prevention strategies); Kroll et al., supra note 240, at 636, 639 (discussing the Internal Revenue Service's use of algorithms to select taxpayers for auditing); see also Peter
Margulies, Surveillance byAlgorithm: The NSA, ComputerizedIntelligence Collection, andHuman
Rights, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1045, 1057-65 (2016) (explaining the use of algorithms to gather intelligence
in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria).
242 See, e.g., Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm Game, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2233 (2018); Emily Berman,A GovernmentofLaws andNot ofMachines, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 130931 (2018); Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparencyforthe Smart City, 20
YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 118-32 (2018); Citron, supra note 9, at 1278-1301; Citron & Pasquale,
supra note 9, at 10-18; Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Improving the Administrative State with
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scholarly community has yet to make the connection between algorithmic governance and its forebear, automated regulation. This Part aims to close that gap
by elucidating the intriguing relationship between regulatory automation and
algorithmic governance. Both have, after all, a lot to learn from one another.
In terms of mathematical sophistication and technical complexity, deeplearning algorithms are lightyears ahead ofthe algebraic formulae that underlie
most regulatory automation. Policy-makers would be well advised, therefore,
to draw on the predictive power of algorithms as they craft the next generation
of self-adjusting regulations.243 For all its mathematical simplicity, automated
regulation boasts something that algorithmic governance misses dearly-a
track record covering more than a century's worth of practical experience. As
the public sector continues to expand its reliance on artificial intelligence and
increasingly seeks to employ algorithms-not only in an advisory capacity but
also for adjudicative purposes-policy-makers would do well to consider valuable lessons learned over the last hundred years of regulatory automation.244
A. The Theory: Algebra Meets Calculus
The term "algorithm" generally denotes the series of mathematical steps
that enable machine learning, commonly understood as the automated process
of discovering relationships and patterns among different variables in a dataset,
usually with the objective of making predictions about future outcomes. 245
Whatever the mathematical nuances that distinguish different algorithms, they
all operate through the optimization, i.e., maximization or minimization, of an
objective function. 24 6 In a recent article, David Lehr and Paul Ohm break down
the algorithmic process into eight distinct steps. 24 7
The first step requires a clear definition of the problem or question to be
solved, such as the goal of predicting ajob candidate's performance if hired,
MachineLearning,42 ADMIN. & REGUL. L. NEWS 7, 8-9 (2017); Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 9, at
3 8-50; Mariano-Florentino Cudlar,A Simpler World? On PruningRisks andHarvestingFruitsin an
&

Orchard of Whispering Algorithms, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 27, 35-41 (2017); Deven R. Desai
Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms andthe Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6-23
(2017); Kim, supra note 240, at 323-27; Kroll et al., supra note-240, at 678-82; McKenzie Raub,
Bots, Bias and Big Data: ArtificialIntelligence, Algorithmic Bias andDisparateImpact Liability in
HiringPractices, 71 ARK. L. REV. 529, 544-58 (2018).
24 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
244 See discussion infra Part
IV.B.
245 See, e.g., KEVIN P. MURPHY, MACHINE LEARNING: A PROBABILISTIC PERSPECTIVE 1-2

(2012).

246 Most common is the use of a loss function that seeks to minimize the disparities
between observed response variable values and fitted response variables as inputs. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BERK,

STATISTICAL LEARNING FROM A REGRESSION PERSPECTIVE 35 (2008).
24, See David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn
About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 670 (2017).
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and the output variable that best represents job performance. 2 48 Next, the data
for the multitude of input variables and the outcome variable must be collected, through gathering of existing and/or measuring of new data. 2 49 In our example, relevant data could be demographic, educational, and other information
about past hires along with their performance on the job, as measured by promotions, salary raises, complaints, and similar indicators. The third step involves cleaning of the assembled dataset, such as by filling in missing values
and correcting for false values.250 An employee's age showing as four-yearsold, for example, would warrant correction, or possibly elimination, of such
data from the set. Next comes a summary statistics review that probes into the
values that a given variable takes on and weeds out outliers.2 5' Step five involves partitioning data into a first set for training the algorithm and a second
set used to test the algorithm's performance on new data.22 Only now is the
stage set for selection, or programming, of the actual algorithm, choosing from
a variety of classes, such as "random forests models" or "neural network"
models, distinguished by the approach taken to optimize the objective function
into which the starting problem has been translated.25 3 Once the algorithm has
been selected, it is trained using the partitioned data set accompanied by
tweaks, known as tuning, iterative assessment of training runs, and feature selection. 4 Finally, after the previous seven steps have been successfully completed, the algorithm is ready to be deployed and to start making predictions
for use in the real world, 5 such as forecasting the job performance of a pool
of applicants.
The dazzling complexity of smart algorithms with their multivariate calculus and iterative learning processes stands in stark contrast to the relative
simplicity ofmost automated regulation. Fuel adjustment clauses, for example,
rely on little more than middle-school algebra to deliver self-executing adjustments to electricity rates. Rate case proceedings generally start with the utility
company's overall revenue requirement (R), commonly denoted by the
straightforward formula of R = - x B + 0, where B represents the utility's
rate-based assets, r denotes the allowed rate of return or cost of capital, and 0

See
See
250 See
251 See
25 See
253 See
254 See
255 See
248

249

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

at 672-77.
at 677-81.
at 681-83.
at 683-84.
at 683-88.
at 688-95 (listing the specific technical criteria guiding the choice of algorithm).
at 695-701.
at 701-02.
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stands for the utility's operating expenses. 256 Thus, the fuel inputs that determine the fuel adjustment clause's operation simply modify one variable in this
formula upward or downward.
In the context of clean energy incentives, automated regulation follows a
similarly straightforward approach, connecting an independent variable (for
example, deployment) to a dependent variable (incentive level), that is subject
The relationship between both can be described as
to potential adjustment.
follows: If deployment is lower than X, the incentive level goes up by a prespecified increment. If deployment is higher than Y, the incentive level ramps
down by a pre-specified increment. Finally, if deployment is higher than X but
lower than Y, the incentive level stays constant.
Replacing the passage of time with a market-related independent variable,
such as deployment, marked an important first step toward more realistic automated adjustments to changes in the cost of emerging technologies, and,
hence, the appropriate level of public policy support. Imagine the possibilities
if, for the next generation of automated regulation, policy-makers turned to
machine learning and smart algorithms to deliver self-executing adjustments.
Instead of a single time- or market-based independent variable, an algorithm
could incorporate the full spectrum of variables that combine to determine the
cost of production for a given technology. In the case of electricity from solar
photovoltaic installations, for example, these variables would include the price
of panels, inverters, racks, and other hardware, as well as the cost of capital,
permitting, labor, and other soft-cost factors. 258 A well-trained algorithm could
use these variables to not only track cost developments, but, importantly, produce more accurate forecasts to inform clean energy incentive levels going
forward.
Upgrading today's crop of automated regulation with the predictive powers of smart algorithms would enable policy-makers to take a more proactive
approach to shaping the energy economy of the future. This algorithmic crystal
ball may come at a cost, however, as it would infuse regulatory automation
with the same concerns about transparency, bias, and other issues that have
spawned such a rich legal literature on algorithmic decision-making. 25 1 If the
widespread scholarly skepticism toward algorithmic governance and machine
learning is any indication of future litigation, then policy-makers will want to

256

For a more detailed discussion of the utility's revenue requirement and its allocation to volu-

metric rates, see JOEL B. EISENET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND

MATERIALS 481-84 (5th ed. 2019).
257 See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying
text.
25 See supra note 120 and accompanying
text.
259 See supra note 242 and accompanying
text.
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carefully weigh, on a case-by-case basis, the relative costs and benefits of adding artificial intelligence to the automated regulation toolkit. 260
B. The Practice:Advisor Meets Adjudicator
Algorithms have become ubiquitous, if not necessarily salient, companions in our daily lives. The private sector relies on their predictive prowess
across a wide range of contexts. 2 6 1The legal literature has long followed-and
criticized-the use of algorithms in credit scoring and reviewing loan applications.2 62 Algorithmic assessments of job candidates and their employability
have garnered similar attention. 2 63 Dating websites have long relied on algorithms to suggest potential partners to their users. 264 The use of big data and
algorithms is revolutionizing medical diagnostics and the delivery of health
care. 2 65 The much-anticipated arrival of self-driving cars depends on machine
learning and smart algorithms to process the multitude of data required to ensure the safety of all traffic participants.2 66 Today, no profession appears immune to the charm of machine learning. Already, "virtual attorneys" are looking to replace flesh-and-blood lawyers. 267 Not even the clergy is safe, with experts predicting that a variety of services historically performed by priests
could soon be provided by algorithms.2 68
With such daunting prospects, it comes as no surprise that interest in machine learning is soaring. In the U.S. financial sector alone, investment in
smart algorithms and other forms of artificial intelligence tripled to more than

260 See discussion supra Part III (exploring the costs and benefits of regulatory automation more
generally).
261 See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
262 See, e.g., Bambauer & Zarsky, supra note 242, at 19-20; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 9, at
8-10.
263 See, e.g., Kim, supra note 240, at 313-14; Raub, supra note 242, at 529-30.
264 See Anupam Chander, The RacistAlgorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1024
(2017).
26 5
See, e.g., Roger Allan Ford & W. Nicholson Price II, Privacy andAccountability in Black-Box
Medicine, 23 MICH. TELECOMMS. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2016); Price, supra note 240, at 425.
266 See, e.g., Bryant Walker Smith, Proximity-DrivenLiability, 102 GEO. L.J. 1777,1779,179293 (2014) (discussing the proliferation of algorithms and other technology as a catalyst for autonomous vehicles).
267 See Karni Chagal-Feferkom, The ReasonableAlgorithm, 2018 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y
111,
113; Anthony Sills, ROSS and Watson Tackle the Law, IBM WATSON BLOG (Jan. 14, 2016), https://
www.ibm.com/blogs/watson/2016/01/ross-and-watson-tackle-the-law [https://perma.cc/SAX2-ZMYS];

Watson Takes the Stand, THE ATLANTIC (IBM SPONSORED CONTENT), http://www.theatlantic.com/

sponsored/ibm-transformation-of-business/watson-takes-the-stand/283 [https://perma.cc/T8DA-2QHG].
268
See Chagal-Feferkorn,supra note 267, at 113;Richard Susskind&Daniel Susskind, Technology
Will Replace Many Doctors, Lawyers, and Other Professionals, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 11, 2016),

https://hbr.org/2016/10/robots-will-replace-doctors-lawyers-and-other-professionals [https://perma.cc/
RGH7-8X34] (forecasting that many traditional professions will be dismantled within decades).
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twelve billion dollars between 2013 and 2014.269 In a2017 report, PriceWaterhouseCoopers estimated that artificial intelligence technologies could boost
global GDP by more than fifteen trillion dollars, or nearly fifteen percent by
2030.270

For all their past success and future promise in the private sector, artificial
intelligence and smart algorithms have so far led a more subdued existence in
the public sector. That is not to say that algorithms do not play any role at
all. 2 71 But contrary to the claims of some commentators, algorithms do not
(yet) regulate our lives. 2 72 Rather than replacing human decision-making as has
occurred in many private contexts, algorithms generally serve to inform and
assist human actors with administrative decision-making. 2 73
In the smart city movement, for example, machine learning helps municipal governments make sense of the vast data-from transportation to energy
consumption to education-used to inform the next generation of urban design.274 What consequences to draw from the data and how to translate insights
into policy action, however, remain the prerogative of human decision-makers.
Similarly, algorithmic intelligence has been used to direct food safety inspectors to establishments that are likely to violate applicable standards but makes
no prescription as to the imposition of fines or other penalties.

2 75

In a fiscal

context, federal agencies rely on algorithmic review of tax returns to select
taxpayers for auditing.276 The actual review of the tax return in question and
269 See Nathaniel Popper, The Robots Are Comingfor Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 28,
2016, at 56, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/magazine/the-robots-are-coming-for-wall-street.
html [https://perma.cc/27FB-SWDH].
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271 See supra note 241 and accompanying
text.
272 But see Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm: Why
a 'Right to an
Explanation'IsProbablyNot the Remedy You Are Looking for, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 19
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273 See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 9, at 7 ("Today, most governmental applications
of machine learning are not determinative of final actions."). Fora survey and critique of the growing use of
artificial intelligence by government agencies to provide low-cost advice to citizens, see Joshua D.
Blank & Leigh Osofsky, Automated Legal Guidance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 4-9), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3 546889 [https://penna.
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See Mohana Ravindmnath, In Chicago, FoodInspectorsAre Guided by Big Data, WASH.
POST (Sept. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-it/in-chicago-food-inspectorsare-guided-by-big-data/2014/09/27/96be8c68-44e0-11e4-b47c-f5889e06le5f_story.html [https://
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any determination of tax evasion or fraud, however, is the responsibility of a
human Internal Revenue Service official. The legal literature has already engaged with the proliferation of predictive policing practices that use big data
and algorithmic intelligence to inform police patrol routes, seeking to leverage
historical crime data to prevent future crime.277 The National Security Agency,
too, has embraced machine learning as an important reconnaissance tool in the
fight against terrorism. 278 Courts, meanwhile, are using algorithms to assess
the risk of recidivism at sentencing.279
A common feature across all of the above government applications of algorithmic intelligence 280 is that machine learning is used to inform, but not
replace, human decision-making. Make no mistake, even limited to an advisory capacity, algorithms are having an impact on public policy and regulation.2 8
Still, as a general matter, algorithms do not exercise adjudicatory functions. It
appears to be only a matter of time, however, for government to employ algorithms in more outcome-determinative ways.2 82 Recent scholarship cautions
that more widespread adoption of algorithms and other forms of artificial intelligence by agencies, who often fail to understand their inner workings, calls
into question the judicial deference that agency expertise traditionally commands.2 83 Expanding government use of (poorly understood) artificial intelligence offers striking parallels to the widespread reliance of agencies on pri277 See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson,PolicingPredictive
Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109,
1123-44 (2017); Joh, supra note 241, at 42-55.
278 See Margulies, supra note 241, at
1057-65.
279 See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 754, 774 (Wis.
2016).
280 The above offers but a snapshot of the many applications of algorithms by governments. Other
equally advisory uses include the administration of social security benefits, bail determinations in
criminal proceedings, as well as immigration matters and travel restrictions. See Chagal-Feferkorn,
supra note 267, at 113; Citron, supra note 9, at 1252. Forfurther instances of algorithmic applications,
see Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 9, at 7-8; Darrell M. West & John R. Allen, How ArtificalIntelligence Is Transformingthe World, BROOKINGS (Apr. 24,2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/
how-artificial-intelligence-is-transforming-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/X2EW-TJDA].
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NaturalResources Defense Council v. United States EnvironmentalProtectionAgency, a

recent U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decision, illustrates the crucial role that even
advisory models and algorithms play for policy-making. 954 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 2020). Following
the Environmental Protection Agency's decision to freeze greenhouse gas emission standards for new
motor vehicles, environmental advocacy organizations filed suit under the Freedom of Information
Act to gain access to the model used to justify the agency's rulemaking a different model than the
one used in prior rulemaking efforts on the same topic. See id
282 See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 9, at 8; see also DAVID FREEMAN ENGSTROM ET AL.,
GOvERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

15-21 (2020), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf
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federal agencies' use of algorithms and other forms of artificial intelligence about which such agencies have limited understanding).
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vate, self-regulatory organizations, including the well-documented problems of
excessive deference to their quasi-governmental actions.2 84
In the early days of the Internet, Monroe Price described the governmental response to technology innovation as an attempt "to divine how the newness of information technology affects the porousness of boundaries, capacities
of old institutions to regulate new realities." 2 5 In the context of regulatory automation by algorithm and other forms of artificial intelligence, government is
in the fortunate position to answer these critical questions with a more educated guess than usual. As we inch closer toward true algorithmic governance,
traditional forms of automated regulation can offer critical guidance to courts,
agencies, and policy-makers.
For more than a century, state and federal agencies have made adjudicatory use of self-adjusting regulations, as illustrated by the case studies surveyed
in Part II. Fuel adjustment clauses have allowed public utility commissions to
set rates for electricity and gas, while similar adjustment mechanisms continue
to determine the value of public policy incentives for emerging clean energy
technologies-all without the need for human involvement.2 86 Such dehumanized governance has been met with skepticism and elicited administrative as
well as judicial challenges, not to mention considerable pushback from the
scholarly community. The resulting battles have produced important insights,
including best and worst practices. As policy-makers seek to assign more outcome-determinative adjudicatory roles to smart algorithms and other forms of
artificial intelligence, they should consider these insights and practices, always
mindful of the fundamental differences between algorithmic and algebraic
forms of automated governance.
CONCLUSION

Shakespeare's Hamlet was neither the first nor the last to grapple with
"the law's delay." 28 7 At some point or another, we have all shared the Prince of
Denmark's frustration with lengthy regulatory proceedings getting in the way
of timely responses to pressing policy issues. For more than a century, regula-

284 See Emily Hammond, Double Deference in AdministrativeLaw,
116 COLUM. L. REV. 1705,
1711 (2016) (warning that "combining . . judicial deference with the oversight agency's deference
obscures the many participatory, deliberative, and transparency-related shortcomings of the overall
scheme"). Onjudicial deference to agency decisions generally, see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. 2Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44, 866 (1984).
5
Monroe E. Price, The Newness ofNew Technology, 22 CARDozo L. REv. 1885, 1886 (2001).
286 See discussion supra Parts II.B., III.B.
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Re Lynchburg Gas Co., 6 P.U.R.3d 33,35 (Va. State Corp. Comm'n), additionalopinion sub
nom. Re Va. Elec. & Power Co., 7 P.U.R.3d 108 (Va. State Corp. Comm'n 1954), aff'dsub nom. City
of Norfolk v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 90 S.E.2d 140 (Va. 1955).
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tory automation has offered an alternative, more expeditious path forward
through self-executing adjustments that keep regulations up to date and effective amidst changing circumstances. The benefits of such autopilot-regulations,
however, extend well beyond mitigating the negative consequences of regulatory inertia.
At a time of congressional deadlock, political partisanship, and growing
polarization, automated regulation's ability to accommodate a wide range of
competing beliefs and assumptions about the future can serve as a catalyst for
more consensual policy-making. Public choice theory suggests that the resulting innate diversity of potential outcomes makes regulatory automation a natural antidote to the frequently observed domination of special interests in the
policy-making process.
Importantly, automated regulation has already received widespread judicial approval and can produce these and other benefits in the here and now.
The greater mathematical sophistication of deep-learning algorithms and other
forms of artificial intelligence might improve the accuracy of self-executing
regulatory adjustments. But policy-makers should weigh the resulting benefits
against the costs associated with upgrading from automated to algorithmic
governance. Widespread concern over the implications of artificially intelligent
regulation for privacy, due process, and other constitutional discontents may
well tip the scales in favor of more simplistic yet well-established forms of
automated regulation, powered by basic algebra instead of multivariate calculus.
Regulatory automation is no panacea. There will always be areas where
ethical concerns and value judgments, among other factors, require human decision-making. Selective use of automated regulation can promote these processes by enabling policy-makers to focus their efforts on those more delicate
domains most deserving of their personal attention.

